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INTRODUCTION

In 1980 Congress, at the behest of the states, passed the Boren
Amendment ("Boren") to the Medicaid Act. The Boren Amendment
transferred to the states the primary authority and responsibility, previously exercised by the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (the "Secretary"), for determining and assuring that
Medicaid payment rates complied with the substantive standards of
the Medicaid Act. The Boren Amendment obligated the states to pay
for nursing home services - and later inpatient hospital services at rates which the states found were reasonable and adequate to meet
the costs incurred by efficiently and economically operated hospitals
and nursing homes to provide care and treatment in compliance with
federal and state quality of care standards.
Largely at the instigation of the states, the Boren Amendment was
repealed by the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. The National Governors
Association ("NGA") argued that the Boren Amendment needlessly
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constrained state direction and imposed excessive fiscal demands. As
the repeal was moving through Congress, several states considered
cutting Medicaid payment rates.'
1. The Medicaid program, which is jointly financed by the federal government and
participating states, provides health insurance coverage for forty million persons, about
twelve percent of the population of the United States. The majority of Medicaid beneficiaries are low income parents and their children. Medicaid provides health insurance
coverage for twenty percent of all children in the United States and is the single largest
purchaser of maternity care, paying for one-third of all births in the United States. Although comprising a much smaller percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries, the elderly consume the greatest amount of covered services. Medicaid, for example, is the largest
purchaser of nursing home, and other long term care services. Medicaid pays for one-half
of all nursing home care and almost forty percent of home and community based care for
the elderly.
In 1999 Medicaid funds represented approximately forty percent of all federal funds
paid to the states. Similarly, Medicaid spending constituted a large portion of state spending. In 2001, Medicaid spending was almost twenty percent of total state expenditures.
Moreover, due to expansion in eligibility and coverage, among other things, Medicaid
spending as a percentage of total state expenditures almost doubled in the period between
1987 and 2001. After a period of unprecedented low growth in Medicaid expenditures,
due primarily to the robust economy, Medicaid expenditures have begun to increase. Between 1995 and 1997 Medicaid expenditures grew at slightly more than three percent per
annum; between 1997 and 1998 the average annual increase in Medicaid expenditures
exceeded five percent. More recently, Medicaid expenditures in fiscal year 2000 grew by
almost eleven percent per annum and such expenditures are predicted to increase by almost fourteen percent in 2001. See 7 BNA: Health Plan & Provider, 1, 1 (Nov. 7, 2001). See
generally Prepared Testimony of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General, United States GeneralAccounting Office, Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, FED. NEWS SERVS.,
Apr. 4, 1995, at 5 (discussing growth in Medicaid program costs and states' efforts to obtain
program waivers). In contrast, the overall federal budget grew at less than four percent in
the 1990's. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: SPENDING PRESSURES DRIVE STATES
TowARD PROGRAM RETENTION, GAO/HEHS-95-122, at 4 (April 1995) [hereinafter GAO/
HEHS-95-122 Report].
Medicaid expenditures have begun to increase at the same time that state revenues
have begun to decline. Forty-four states reported actual revenues below forecasted levels as
fiscal year 2001 began. A significant number of states also reported expenditures that exceeded budgeted levels. By the beginning of fiscal year 2001, seven states had convened
special sessions to address budget shortfalls and a total of twenty-eight states had implemented or considered budget cuts. Unable, or unwilling, to cut eligibility or coverage,
states began to seek alternatives means of constraining or reducing expenditures. Among
other things, states sought to cap, or reduce, spending for nursing home care. In some
instances, efforts were made to substitute home and community based care for nursing
home care. In addition, about one-third of the states adopted or proposed freezes or reductions in payments to institutional providers. Thus, while few states actually implemented payment rate reductions at the time of the repeal, many states took steps to do so
as the economy slowed and the revenue dropped. These actions were taken despite the
fact that an August 2001 study prepared for the American Health Care Association found
that Medicaid payments to nursing homes failed to cover the cost of such services in fortynine of the fifty states. The shortfall between payment rates and the cost of services averaged in excess of nine dollars per patient day of care (ranging from a low of $2.69 per
patient day of care in North Carolina to a high of $21.11 per patient day of care in New
Jersey).
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In this article the background and the legislative history of the
Medicaid Act's payment standards, including the Boren Amendment,
as well as their application by the Courts are analyzed. The replacement legislation for the Boren Amendment and its legislative history
also are examined. Finally, other provisions of the Medicaid Act that
provide a basis for providers to challenge the adequacy of Medicaid
payments are considered.
The article concludes that the Medicaid Act contains payment criteria that institutional care providers can enforce, notwithstanding repeal of the Boren Amendment. In fact, repeal of the Boren
Amendment eliminated special payment criteria and procedures
favorable to states and applicable only to payments to institutional
providers. Repeal of Boren actually removed limitations on the Secretary's responsibility to assure that states' Medicaid payments to institutional providers complied with the Medicaid Act. As a result, this
article argues, the effect of Boren's repeal is to remand the states to
the Medicaid Act's general substantive and procedural payment standards, restore the Secretary's duty to review and validate the compliance of the states with the Act's payment standards and to assure
affirmatively on an ongoing basis that state Medicaid payment methodologies comply with the Act. Despite the intentions of the states
and the Congress that repealed Boren, states no longer have the protections afforded by Boren and providers should be able to enforce
the Act's substantive requirements against the states and the Act's procedural requirements against the Secretary. Together, these requirements mandate that the Secretary approve and provide federal
funding only for State Medicaid payment methodologies and procedures that assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers
so that Medicaid beneficiaries have the same access to services as the
general population.

The information discussed above regarding aggregate Medicaid spending is taken
from reports prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. See V.
Smith & E. Ellis, Medicaid Budgets Under Stress: Survey Findingsfor State Fiscal Year 2000, 2001
and 2002, Health Management Assoc. (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Medicaid Budgets];J. Guyer,
Policy Brief. The Role of Medicaid in State Budgets, HenryJ. Kaiser Family Found. (Oct. 2001)
[hereinafter Policy Brie]. The data regarding the shortfall in Medicaid payments versus the
cost of services was extracted from A BRIEFING CHARTBOOK ON SHORTFALLS IN MEDICAID
FUNDING FOR NURSING HOME CARE prepared for the American Health Care Association by
BDO Seidman, LLP (Aug. 2001).
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THE MEDICAID PROGRAM

Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that pays for medical
services provided to eligible poor and disabled persons. 2 States need
not participate in Medicaid.3 States that choose to participate, however, must administer their Medicaid program in conformance with
the Medicaid Act and applicable federal regulations. 4 Although certain services and individuals must be covered by a state Medicaid program, states may choose to provide additional services or cover
additional individuals. 5 Participating states receive federal funds to
pay part of the cost of providing covered services.6
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000), Title XIX of the Social Security Act (formally denominated "Grants to the States for Medical Assistance Programs"). Title XIX was enacted as
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (2000)).
Medicaid is the largest third-party payor of nursing home care in the United States.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. The federal contribution, known as federal financial participation (and formerly
referred to as the federal medical assistance percentage), varies from fifty percent to approximately eighty percent of the states' Medicaid expenditures. See 42 U.S.C.
§§.1396b(a)(1), 1396(b) (2000). The percentage of a state's Medicaid expenditures eligible for federal matching is determined using a formula that is heavily dependent on a
state's per capita income. At the time the formula was adopted, Congress' intention was to
provide poor states with more federal funds relative to wealthier states. This sliding scale
was intended to provide relative equity in health care services. Relatively wealthier states
were presumed to be better able to fund their Medicaid programs from state tax revenues
than poorer states. Poorer states were presumed to require greater resources to improve
and expand their health care delivery systems and to provide access for unreserved
populations.
Since the early 1980's, the federal matching formula, and especially the use of per
capita income and the statutory minimum fifty percent matching rate, has been the subject
of intense and repeated criticism by the General Accounting Office ("GAO"). See, e.g.,
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHANGING MEDICAID FORMULA CAN IMPROVE
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS TO STATES, No. GAO/GGD-83-27 at 25 (Mar. 9, 1983); UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID FORMULA: FAIRNESS COULD BE IMPROVED,

No. GAO/T-HRD-91-5 (Dec. 7, 1990); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, No.

GAO/HRD-91-66FS;

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: MATCHING FORMULA'S PERFORM-

ANCE AND POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS, GAO/T-HEHS-92-226; UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, MEDICAID: METHODS

FOR SETTING

NURSING HOME RATES SHOULD BE

GAO/HRD-86-26 (May, 1986) [hereinafter GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report]. Among
other things, GAO has noted that per capital income is an inappropriate measure of a
state's ability to fund its Medicaid program and, further, that the formula does not take
into account the number of persons actually living in poverty in the state. Further, GAO
found that the fifty percent minimum federal matching payment in a recent year provided
thirty-six states with nearly seven billion federal dollars more than they would have been
paid under a proposed "equitable" formula that accounted for state funding resources and
the number of low-income residents actually in need of health services. See UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID FORMULA: EFFECTS OF PROPOSED FORMULA ON FEDERAL SHARES OF STATE SPENDING, GAO/HEHS-99-29R, at 10 (Feb. 19, 1999) (relying on
IMPROVED,

2001]

FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUALITY NURSING CARE

163

Congress delegated the responsibility for overseeing the operation of state Medicaid programs to the United States Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS").7 Within HHS, the administration of Medicaid is the responsibility of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services ("CMS"), formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA").8
A state that participates in Medicaid must designate a "single state
agency" to administer the state's Medicaid program.9 The single state
agency must administer the state's program according to a "State
Plan."'" The State Plan, is a "comprehensive statement" of the state's
Medicaid program which must include "assurances that it will be administered in conformity with the specific requirements" of the Social
Security Act and HHS regulations.'1
The State Plan must be submitted to and approved by the Secretary. 2 The Secretary is obliged to approve any State Plan which complies with the requirements of the Medicaid Act.'" Federal matching
funds can be paid to a state only if the Secretary has approved the
state's Medicaid Plan.' 4
Nursing home care is a mandatory Medicaid service." The Medicaid Act specifies both the types of care and the services that must be
provided by nursing homes that participate in a state Medicaid program. 6 The Act also sets the quality of care standards that must be
satisfied by a nursing home that serves Medicaid beneficiaries.1 7 The
Medicaid Act imposes a high standard on nursing homes: "A skilled
nursing facility must provide services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial wellbeing of each resident . . . " According to the Secretary, this obliga-

1997 Health Care Financing Administration data to estimate the fiscal effect of a proposed
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage change).
7. HHS formerly was known as the Department of Health Education and Welfare. In
order to avoid confusion, the Department will be referred to by its current name, HHS,
throughout the article.
8. The Health Care Financing Administration recently was renamed the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. Because the majority of statutes, regulations and cases
refer to HCFA, that acronym will be used throughout this article.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (2000).
10. See id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 201.3 (2001).
11. 45 C.F.R. § 201.2 (2001).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2000).
13. See id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10) (A), 1396d(a)(4)(A) (2000).
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(a)-(d) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2001).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(2) (2000).
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tion requires that nursing facilities assure that each facility resident
achieves "the highest level of functioning and well-being," and, further, that each resident achieves "optimal improvement," subject only
to the resident's right to refuse treatment and the recognized effects
of pathology and aging.' 9
Although Medicaid programs are, for the most part, administered
by the states, the Medicaid Act imposes specific obligations on the Secretary with respect to implementation of State Plan provisions regarding nursing facilities.. The Act provides:
It is the duty and responsibility of the Secretary to assure that
requirements which govern the provision of care in nursing
facilities under State Plans approved under this tide, and the
enforcement of such requirements, are adequate to protect
to prothe health, safety, welfare, and rights of residents and
20
moneys.
public
of
use
efficient
and
effective
mote
This provision does not impose any new obligations on the Secretary. Instead, the provision makes explicit a duty that the courts previously held was implicit in numerous other provisions of the Medicaid
Act; the Secretary must assure that Medicaid programs pay only for
high quality care mandated by the Act and that nursing home residents actually receive such care.25
II.

MEDICAID PAYMENT FOR NURSING HOME CARE: THE ACT AND ITS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A.

OriginalPayment Standards

In 1966 when the Medicaid Act was adopted, the statute did not
contain any substantive standards governing payment for nursing
home services.22 As a result, the states adopted a plethora of payment
methodologies based on a variety of factors, some of which had little
19.

HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL (SOM): PRO-

VIDER CERTIFICATION

113, TRANSMITTAL 250 (April 1992) [hereinafter Transmittal 250].

20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(f) (1) (2000).
21. See Smith v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 583, 590 (10th Cir. 1984).
22. The General Accounting Office noted the Act's lack of specific requirements governing payment for nursing home services:
Initially, the Medicaid law did not include any specific requirements regarding
the methods to be used to pay for nursing home services. States were permitted
to develop their own payment methods, subject to the general requirement that
payments not exceed reasonable charges consistent with economy, efficiency, and
quality of care.
Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n. v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1979);
GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 9. See also Park Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of
Social Servs., 28 B. R. 793, 796-97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
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or nothing to do with the actual cost of delivering nursing home
care.

23

After a little more than five years experience with the Medicaid
program, Congress determined that the failure to specify substantive
payment standards had produced unacceptable results. Some nursing
facilities were being overpaid, but others were paid too little. As a
result, many nursing homes were unable to deliver the quantity and
quality of care needed to meet residents' needs. Indeed, in a number
of instances, states confronting budget crises had resolved the crises
by refusing to fund the Medicaid program adequately. 24 Consequently, even if the State Plan in theory provided adequate payment,
nursing homes sometimes did not receive payment for care - both
already delivered and yet to be delivered - at the rate provided by
the State Plan and anticipated by the nursing home.2 5
In 1972 Congress amended the Medicaid Act to mandate that
states participating in the Medicaid program pay nursing homes on a
"reasonable cost related" basis. 26 This standard required that Medi23. One court addressed the variety of payment methodologies used by the states:
There are wide variations among the States in the manner of financing the cost of
nursing home care provided to the needy. In some states the full cost of care is
paid. In others, a negotiated rate is developed which may or may not approximate the reasonable cost or reasonable charges for the services provided. Some
states, however, depend upon the supplementation of the State's agency's below
cost allowances for care with contributions from relatives or the needy individual
himself.
Johnson's Prof'l Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting
S. REP. No. 744, at 187-88 (1967) reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3026). Similarly, the General Accounting Office found that:
States tried a variety of payment methods ranging from the retrospective, reasonable cost reimbursement system used by Medicare to prospective rates based in
some instances on state budgets or other factors not directly related to costs associated with providing nursing home care.
GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 9. See generally Medicaid Program; Payment for
Long-Term Care Facility Servs. and Inpatient Hosp. Servs., 46 Fed. Reg. 47,964 (Sept. 30,
1981) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 447) [hereinafter 1981 Medicaid Program].
24. See Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 921 (5th Cir.
2000).
25. GAO reported that:
The Congress was concerned that some nursing homes were being paid too
much, while others were not being paid enough to support the quality of care
needed by Medicaid patients.
GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report supra note 6, at 9. See also Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v.
Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that the state Medicaid program had "a
history of financial crises and inadequate funding."); Park Nursing Ctr., Inc. 28 B.R. at 79697.
26. Social Security Amendments of 1972 § 249(a), Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1410
(1972) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(E)). The "reasonable cost related" statutory
provision that added a reimbursement standard to the Medicaid Act was, according to
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caid payments to providers of nursing home services be predicated on
the actual and reasonable costs incurred in treating those patients.2 7
Notwithstanding the requirements to base payments on the cost of
services, the Act conferred extensive discretion on the states to develop the payment methods and standards that would be used to determine nursing home payments rates.28 As the court explained in
Alabama Nursing Home Association v. Califano:
Congress intended that the state authorities in developing
methodologies for reasonable cost related reimbursement
have great flexibility in the areas of cost-funding and ratesetting. The legislative history indicates that the states are to
be free to experiment with methods and standards for payment that would be simpler and less expensive than the complex Medicare reasonable cost formula . . . Congress
approved the setting reasonable cost related rates on either a
prospective or retrospective basis.... Congress similarly approved the setting of payment rates on a geographical class,
or facility-by-facility basis. . . . Additionally, Congress intended that states have freedom both to define allowable
cost items
and to set a value on the reasonable cost of such
29
items.
Thus, the legislative history of the reasonable cost related provision
makes explicit Congress' intention that states have freedom both to
define reimbursable costs and to determine the reasonable costs of
30
care, services and equipment.

Congress, to be effective July 1, 1976. The Secretary's implementing regulation, however,
did not require the states to be in compliance until January 1, 1978. GAO/T-HRD-86-26
Report, supra, note 6, at 9. See Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 433 F. Supp.
1325, 1331 (M.D. Ala. 1977) (holding Secretary's regulation invalid "insofar as it sets an
effective date other than July 1, 1976"), affirmed, 617 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (13) (E).
28. 1981 Medicaid Program, supra note 23, at 47,965. In 1972, Congress amended Tite
XIX of the Social Security Act to require that state plans provide: "[ffor payment of the
skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility services provided under the plan on a
reasonable cost basis, as determined in accordance with methods and standards which
shall be developed by the State on the basis of cost-finding methods approved and verified
by the Secretary. . . ." See 42 U.S.C. §1396(a)(13)(E).

The amendment was designed to confer flexibility on the states to determine an appropriate payment methodology. See, e.g., Alabama Hosp. Assoc. v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955,
958 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that state became "dissatisfied with the Medicare principles it
had previously used and developed an alternative [prospective] reimbursement methodology as permitted by the then effective [reasonable cost] code provision .....
29. Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n, 617 F.2d at 392.
30. See S. REP. No. 92-1230, at 287 (1972). See also Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n, 617
F.2d at 392.
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The states' payment methods had to be reviewed, compliance
with the Act had to be verified and each state's methodology had to be
approved by the Secretary, however." Both the Secretary and the
courts pointed out that Congress conferred Plan approval authority
on the Secretary because of concern that, in the past, states had
adopted "unrealistically low" rates and had "refus[ed] to recognize as
allowable costs some of the real costs of providing the services" imposing on nursing facilities "pressure to cut corners and provide lower
quality care." 2 Moreover, the depth of Congress' concern is evidenced by the requirement that the Secretary approve and veiify both
the state's cost-finding methods and the state's proposed rate-setting
methodology."
In order to obtain the Secretary's approval of a reasonable cost
related payment plan the states were required to submit to the Secretary, along with the proposed Plan, a detailed explanation of the proposal.3 4 Among other things, the state had to explain to the Secretary
the anticipated effect of the state's payment system.35 The state's explanation had to be supported by "documentation or analysis showing
that the plan's methods and standards actually produced a reimbursement rate that fell within the maximum and minimum allowable
rates. '36 Moreover, the Secretary was required to conduct an independent study or analysis to ensure that the [state]'s plan complied
with the statutory requirement.3 7 The Secretary's approval was necessary before the payment methodology became effective.
The Secretary's review focused on verifying the appropriateness
of each element in the state's payment methods and standards. The
Secretary judged and validated "a State's payment methods and standards from a technical standpoint,"3 ' determining whether each component produced adequate payment for the goods and services
addressed by that portion of the payment methodology. Each element of the Plan had to be justified on both a stand alone basis and
based on its interaction with other payment methods and standards. 9
The Secretary's review examined whether the individual elements of
the payment methodology (e.g., nursing salaries, food costs, etc.) were

31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (62) (b) (2000).
32. Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 393 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980).
33. See id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2000).
See id.
Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n, 617 F.2d at 394.
See id.
1981 Medicaid Program, supra note 23, at 47,965.
See id.
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reasonably cost related, and then determined whether the aggregate
payment rate was reasonably cost related. The Secretary could not
approve a plan based on "the application of.

.

. [an] institutional

assumption" that a plan with certain characteristics should satisfy the
statutory standard.4" Secretarial approval "represent[ed] a comprehensive judgment that [the Plan] elements, and their interaction, result in payments that are consistent with the requirements in [the Act]
and the regulations that implement it."'"
The states complained that the reasonable cost related regulations were complex and that it was difficult to demonstrate compliance to the Secretary's satisfaction. The states argued that, in order to
secure federal approval, most state Medicaid programs simply
adopted Medicare's retrospective cost based reimbursement principles. The states also argued that use of Medicare principles was inherently inflationary because such principles contained no incentives for
efficient performance.4 2
B.

The States Get Wat They Asked For: The Boren Amendment
Is Adopted

In 1980, Congress amended the Medicaid Act and changed the
Act's payment criteria for skilled nursing facilities." This legislation,
now repealed, was known as the Boren Amendment.4 4 The Boren
Amendment provided in pertinent part as follows:
[A] State plan for medical assistance must... provide ... for

payment.., of the hospital services, nursing facility services,
and services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally
retarded ...

through the use of rates (determined in accor-

dance with the methods and standards developed by the
State...) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to
meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws,
regulations, and quality and safety standards and to assure

40. Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n, 617 F.2d at 394.
41. 1981 Medicaid Program, supra note 23, at 47,965.
42. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 447.276(c) (2001) (Medicare methodology automatically approved); 1981 Medicaid Program, supra note 23, at 47,966. See also GAO/T-HRD-86-26
Report, supra note 6, at 10 (states complained that reasonable cost related standard was too
restrictive and inflexible).
43. The Act was amended one year later to extend the Boren Amendment's provisions
to hospital reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1982).
44. Named for retired Sen. David H. Boren, D-Okla., who championed it.
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that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access (taking into account geographic location and reasonable travel time) to inpatient hospital services of
adequate quality ......
Boren made two major changes in the payment standards imposed by
federal law. One change revised the process used by the states and
the Secretary to develop, review and approve the payment provisions
of state Medicaid plans. The second change altered the substantive
payment standards imposed by the Medicaid Act.
First, prior to Boren, the Secretary was responsible for determining whether the State Plan satisfied federal standards.4 6 Boren, however, stripped that authority from the Secretary and transferred it to
the states.4 7 As a result, after 1980, the states were responsible for
determining - i.e., making a finding - that their Medicaid payment
Plans satisfied federal standards.4" Boren provided that the Secretary
was obliged to fund state Medicaid Plans based solely "on the [state's]
assurances which attest to the fact that the State's findings do indeed
indicate that the payment rates are reasonable .... -"4' The Secretary
could not look behind the state's assurances or examine the state's
finding unless it was patent on the face of the Plan that the assurance
was false.5 ° In fact, the Secretary did not receive or review the State's

45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (A) (1981).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2000).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) (1981).
48. See Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789 (10th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990); Alabama Hosp. Assoc. v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 958
(5th Cir. 1983); Indiana Ass'n of Homes for the Aging, Inc. v. Office of Medicaid Policy,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16163 at *4 (7th Cir. 1995); Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F.
Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D.Ill. 1991).
49. Final Rule, Payment for Long Term Care Facility Services and Inpatient Hospital
Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,051 (Dec. 19, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Medicaid
Program].
50. See, e.g., Erie County Geriatric Ctr. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1991) (illustrating the extreme limitation imposed on the Secretary's State Plan approval authority after
Boren). Erie County is the only reported decision holding that a State Plan was invalid
because the Secretary's approval was unwarranted. In fact, Erie County may be the only
Boren case in which the Secretary's approval was the principal issue, rather than the State's
Plan development process. See also GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 10 (Secretary did not review technical merit of studies and analyses supporting state's finding). Cf

Alabama Hosp. Assoc., 702 F.2d at 962 (suggesting that, because the plan's "general structure" was upheld, the district court could "choose not to suspend operation of the plan
altogether" even though the plan did not include specific components required by the

Medicaid Act). CompareAlabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 465 F. Supp. 1183, 1186
(M.D. Ala. 1979) (upholding Secretary's plan approval even though "there is no valid statistical basis" for the rates in the state plan), reversed 617 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that Boren's predecessor required the Secretary to establish criteria defining efficiently
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findings or the data on which the findings were based.5 1 The relative
unimportance of the Secretary under Boren is illustrated by the fact
that the state's payment system could be implemented even prior to
the time that it was submitted to, or approved by, the Secretary. 2 The
Secretary's review process was so perfunctory that the courts generally
refused to defer to the Secretary's approval of a state's payment

Plan.53
Second, prior to Boren, federal law required that each component of the state's payment methods and standards result in reasonable cost related payment. Boren, however, shifted the focus of the
substantive inquiry from elements of the payment methodology to the
reasonableness and adequacy of the aggregate payment rate. Thus,
the state was authorized to use virtually any type of payment methodology so long as the state concluded that the aggregate payment rate
was reasonable and adequate, as defined by the Act. Moreover, the
Boren Amendment only required payment of the costs that "must be
incurred by efficiently and economically" operated nursing homes.5 4
Further, under Boren, the reasonableness and adequacy of the payment rate was tested by determining whether the state paid the reasonable and allowable costs of delivering services incurred by
substantial percentages of nursing facilities in the state. 55 The possiand economically operated and to verify, based on documentation and analysis, that payment rate satisfied statute).
51. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). See also GAO/T-HRD-86-26
Report, supra note 6, at 10 (The Secretary "does not require submission of studies or analyses supporting the 'finding' and provides no guidance on what constitutes an acceptable
basis for a 'finding.'"); Independent Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1252
(9th Cir. 1999); Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 793 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D.Ct. 1992) (State
"is not required to submit these findings to the HCFA, but the findings are subject to
judicial scrutiny.").
52. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.20 (2001).
53. See, e.g.,
Erie County, 952 F.2d at 71; Independent Nursing Home v. Simmons, 732 F.
Supp. 684, 687-88 (S.D. Miss 1990) (characterizing the Secretary's review as "cursory" because the Agency has no obligation to, and does not, "'examine [the state's] assurances for
accuracy or truthfulness or for anything,'" quoting Mary Washington Hosp., Inc. v. Fisher,
635 F. Supp. 891, 898 (E.D. Va. 1985)).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) (2000); see generally 1981 Medicaid Program, supra
note 23, at 47,965.
55. See infta note 123 and cases collected there using percentage of facilities' paid cost
of service to determine whether rates fell within a "zone of reasonableness."
A second approach sometimes used focused on the percentage of providers' total
costs of service paid by Medicaid statement, rather than the percentage of providers paid
the full cost of service. The flaws in this approach was addressed by the Third Circuit:
While aggregate [cost] coverage is telling, it is not dispositive. Among other
things ...,further analysis might provide evidence as to whether a large percentage of the unreimbursed costs must be incurred by efficiently and economically
operated facilities. If this is true, evidence of aggregate cost cover ...would not
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bility that an individual nursing facility might not be paid the full costs
of serving Medicaid beneficiaries, or that individual items of cost
might not be fully reimbursed, was irrelevant.5 6
suffice to show compliance with the federal requirement that the rates be reasonable and adequate.
NewJersey Hosp. Ass'n v. Waldman, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37153 at *11 (3d Cir. 1995). In
short, the statute defined reasonable and adequate rates by whether payments covered the
costs incurred by efficiently and economically operated providers, not by the percentage of
total costs of care reimbursed statewide.
56. The magnitude of the change wrought by the Boren Amendment is evident from
comparisons of cases decided under the reasonable cost related standard and cases decided after Boren. For example, in Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n the Fifth Circuit held that
the Secretary had an obligation "to ensure that the [state's] payment methodology would
in fact result in reasonable cost related reimbursement." 617 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1980).
Further, the Court held that the Secretary had illegally failed to establish specific criteria or
standards defining the meaning of crucial statutory and regulatory terms. Specifically, the
state had failed to define an efficiently and economically operated facility and also failed to
formulate criteria to judge the reasonableness of the classes used in the reimbursement
methodology. The Secretary failed to verify that the payment methodology, in fact, resulted in reasonable cost related payment. In contrast, several courts, post Boren, held
that neither the states nor the Secretary had an obligation to define or to identify efficient
and economical facilities. Compare Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d 1460,
1464 (7th Cir. 1993), Alabama Hosp. Assoc. v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that, under Boren, it was unnecessary for court to decide whether Secretary, or
the state, was obliged to define statutory terms before approving State Plan); Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Childers, 1995 WL 504806 at *5 (W.D.Ky. 1995) and 1983 Medicaid Program,
supra note 49, at 56,049 with Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879
F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990). After Boren, the Secretary,
with the support of the judiciary, disclaimed authority to verify the state's findings or even
to verify that the state had in fact, made the required finding. To the contrary, the Secretary argued that, if the state assured that the required finding was made, the Secretary was
required to approve the State Plan. See, e.g., Erie County Geriatric Ctr. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d
71, 78 (3d Cir. 1991); 48 FED. REG. 56,046, 56,052 (1983) ("federal review.., not directed
toward validating a state's payment methods and standards ... ).
So complete was the deference accorded the states with respect to both cost finding
and rate calculation that many believed the Secretary had abdicated his responsibility to
assure compliance with the Medicaid Act. For example, after studying the Medicaid program, the General Accounting Office stated:
[E]xisting HCFA guidance and monitoring have been inadequate to ensure
proper accountability and compliance with the requirements in the statute and
regulations that all nursing homes receive reasonable and adequate
reimbursement.
[W]e recommend . .. that HHS, to maintain proper accountability, determine
whether states have established criteria to define [the statutory standards] and
develop payment methods and standards based on studies or analyses supporting
the reasonableness and adequacy of the resulting rates.
As emphasized in the conference report on the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980, the Secretary of HHS retains final authority to review the rates and disapprove them if they do not meet the requirements of the statute ... HCFA's acceptance of a state's assurance based on whether a 'finding' has been made does
not.., provide an adequate basis for determining (as HHS acknowledges HCFA
is responsible for doing) whether the state has complied with the requirements in
the statute and regulations.
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The Legislative History of the Boren Amendment

The legislative history of the Boren Amendment identifies two related problems that the Amendment was intended to address. The
Senate Finance Committee Report argues that complex federal payment requirements in conjunction with an exhaustive federal evaluation and approval process denied the states the administrative and
fiscal discretion to design their Medicaid programs. 7 The states, it
was argued, simply deferred to HCFA, and avoided the cumbersome
review process by adopting the automatically approvable Medicare

payment principles.5" As a practical matter, states, it was argued,
could not establish payment systems on, for example, a prospective
basis or tie payments to what care should cost versus what care did
59

cost.

The Senate Report emphasizes that, under the Boren Amendment, states are free to establish rates on a statewide or other geographic basis, or on an institution by institution basis, and without
reference to Medicare principles. The 1981 Senate Report - which
was given special emphasis by the Secretary in developing regulations
to implement Boren 6 ° - also stated that the Committee expected the
Secretary to keep regulatory and other preconditions to Plan approval
to the minimum necessary to assure proper accountability. Indeed,
the Report stated explicitly that a state's assurance of compliance with
federal standards would normally be conclusive. 6 '
Paradoxically, although Boren transferred responsibility for determining whether the state's Medicaid Plan complied with federal
law from the Secretary to the states, neither Boren nor the legislative
history defined any of the key terms of the legislation.6 2 In regulations implementing the statute, the Secretary also declined to provide

See GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 31-32. The Secretary rejected GAO's recommendations. See id. at 30-31. Similarly, courts routinely held that the states were not
required to submit documentation supporting their findings and that the Secretary was
under no obligation to conduct any analysis of the state's assurance that its payment rates
met the Boren Amendment's standards. See, e.g., Connecticut Hosp. Assoc'n, 793 F. Supp. at
51.
57. See S. REP. No. 92-1230, at 288 (1972).
58. See id.
59. See id. But see Alabama Hosp. Assoc. v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 959 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting that state replaced Medicare payment methodology with a prospective payment
system that was reviewed and approved by the Secretary under the reasonable cost standard); Park Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Social Servs., 28 B.R.793, 801-02 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (same).
60. See 1981 Medicaid Program, supra note 23, at 47,968.
61. See S. REP. No. 97-139, at 478 (1981).
62. See 1983 Medicaid Program, supra note 49, at 56,049.
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federal definitions. The Secretary asserted that such definitions
"would unnecessarily intrude upon the legislatively mandated flexibility provided to States ....,"68 The Secretary even declined to require
each state to provide its own definition of an "efficiently and economically" operated facility.6 4 Thus, discretion to define key terms in the
federal statute, such as "reasonable," "adequate," or "efficiently and
economically operated facility" was left to the states along with the
discretion to determine whether their Plans satisfied those definitions.
The legislative history also makes clear that the broad discretion
transferred to the states was not unlimited. The 1980 Conference
Committee Report stated that the conferees "intended that a State not
develop rates . . .solely on the basis of budgetary appropriations."65
The Senate Report also states that Boren was "not intended to encourage arbitrary reductions in payment that would adversely affect
the quality of care."6 6 For this reason, the Boren Amendment mandates that reimbursement rates be sufficient to enable nursing facilities to "provide care and services in conformity with applicable State
and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards .... 67
Congress' effort to assure that Medicaid payment rates were reasonable and adequate to provide the quality of care mandated by the
Act was not isolated or fleeting. Seven years later additional amendments to Boren further tied the adequacy of payment rates to the
nursing homes' ability to deliver quality care.68 The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 modified Boren to require that payment rates
"take into account ...the costs of services required to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental and psychosocial well-being of each resident ....
This requirement - expressly defining payment rates in terms of
nursing facilities' ability to deliver quality care - was a novel and innovative approach to Medicaid rate setting and was, perhaps, the most
important aspect of Boren. Prior to adoption of the Boren Amendment, the reasonableness and adequacy of Medicaid payment was de-

63. Id.
64. "The reason for this is that the State's methods and standards implicitly act as the
state's definition of an efficiently and economically operated facility, and no explicit definition is necessary." Id.
65. S. REP. No. 97-139, at 478 (1981).
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) (2000).
68. See id.

69. Id. See also Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 568 F. Supp.
1001, 1009-10 (E.D.Pa. 1983) ("Beginning in fiscal 1982 there will be an annual percentage
reduction in the federal funds a state will receive for Medicaid reimbursement ....").
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fined, almost exclusively in economic terms, i.e., by comparing
Medicaid payment to the cost actually incurred to provide services.
The fact that health care was involved was irrelevant. The standards
used to determine economic and efficient operation were predicated
on financial analysis and could have been applied to a public utility or
virtually any business. Boren, however, required states to make a finding and to assure the Secretary that payments were sufficient to allow
providers to comply with state and federal quality of care standards.7 y
Thus, the Boren Amendment tested the reasonableness and adequacy
of payment rates in terms of nursing homes' ability to comply with
federal and state quality of care standards.
Congress plainly sought to preclude states from continuing to
balance Medicaid budgets on the backs of beneficiaries. 7y Linking
payment rates to quality care and regulatory enforcement standards
was simple common sense, but it was also motivated by concern that
the care scandals caused by arbitrary, budget driven Medicaid cuts in
the 1960's and 1970's not be repeated.
Superficially, the legislative history can be read to indicate that
passage of the Boren Amendment reflected the culmination of the
states' efforts to escape from burdensome and tedious federal oversight of their Medicaid spending decisions.7 2 Although the states
surely desired to avoid federal interference with their spending decisions, it would be a gross mistake to view Boren as the culmination of
a principled effort to vindicate state sovereignty.
Boren was, in its inception and implementation, an effort to reduce federal and state expenditures. The legislative history of Boren,
for example, begins with a Senate Finance Committee Report titled
"Spending Reductions: Recommendations of the Committee on Finance Required by the Reconciliation Process., 7 ' Thus, shortly after
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) (2000).
71. Prior to Boren, the States often had attempted to tie Medicaid payment rates to
state appropriations. After adoption of the reasonable cost related standard, such attempts
were generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n. v. Califano, 433 F.
Supp. 1325, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 1977) (State legislature's failure to appropriate sufficient
funds does not excuse compliance with Medicaid Act). After Boren, states continued to
attempt to balance their budgets by cutting Medicaid payments. See, e.g., Illinois Hosp.
Ass'n v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 576 F. Supp. 300, 361 (ND. Ill. 1983); Lapeer County Med. Care
Facility v. Michigan, No. 1:91-CV-333, 1992 WL 220917, at *2 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
72. See, e.g., Alabama Hosp. Assoc. v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 959 n.9 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting that in adopting Boren, Congress recognized "the inflationary nature of the current cost reimbursement system and intends to give States greater latitude in developing
and implementing alternative reimbursement methodologies that promote the efficient
and economical delivery of such services.").
73. See H.R Con. Res. 307, 96th Cong. § 3(a)(115) (1981).
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Boren was adopted, the Fifth Circuit held that a State Plan payment
methodology approved under the repealed reasonable cost standard
which the court characterized as requiring higher provider payments than Boren - ipsofacto complied with the Boren Amendment.
The Court stated:
HHS approved the plan under the "reasonable cost" standard contained in the former code provision, a standard
which is more generous from the [plaintiff hospitals'] perspective. Congress, in replacing the reasonable cost standard
with one based on considerations of efficiency and economy,
intended to give the states flexibility to lower reimbursement
levels below those required by the reasonable cost standard.
Because the new "efficient cost" standard is designed to
lower the threshold of permissible reimbursement rates,
rates properly approved under the reasonable cost standard
will satisfy the new efficient cost standard. In fact [the plaintiff hospitals] offer no plausible reason why the [Secretary],
after approving the plan under the more restrictive reasonable cost standard, might reach a different result under a suitable defined efficient cost standard."4
Further, within one year Boren was followed by a package of
Medicaid amendments that included significant cuts in federal contributions to state Medicaid programs.7 5 Congress planned to cut federal outlays for Medicaid by more than 900 million dollars in fiscal
year 1982.76 The new law also provided for a scaled reduction of federal payments to states in later years with cuts in Medicaid payments of
an additional two percent in 1983 and one percent in 1984. 77 Federal
money constituted between fifty and eighty-three percent of the Medicaid funding for any state. Obviously, Congress knew the planned
78
cuts would have a significant impact.
Congress mollified the states' opposition to cuts in federal funding by guaranteeing the states the near unilateral discretion to set
Medicaid payment rates. In fact, Congress mandated the cuts in federal funding, but prohibited HHS from implementing the cuts until
the Secretary promulgated regulations implementing Boren.

74. Alabama Hosp. Assoc., 702 F.2d at 958-59 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Children's Hosp.
of Philadelphia, 568 F. Supp. at 1010 (holding that Boren "beyond question ... authorized
the states to implement ...

75.
76.
77.
78.

cost containment scheme.").

See H.R. REP. No. 158, at 279 (1981); and S. REP. No. 139, at 477 (1981).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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There was undoubtedly some truth to the contention that the
Secretary's review process was cumbersome and inhibited creative rate
setting. Yet, it is hard to credit the states' argument for more discretion and for the opportunity to innovate as complete. The real problem at the heart of the state's demand for change was that, after ten
years of arbitrary rate setting, the states found intolerable the mandate
in Boren's predecessor that payment methods bear a real, verifiable
reasonable relationship to the cost of care. The states simply could
not tolerate federal oversight that demanded that States demonstrate
that their Medicaid payment methodologies actually comply with federal law. 79 The states supported Boren primarily because they believed that the amendment gave them discretion to cut payments
without any federal oversight to confirm that their assurances of compliance with federal law were grounded in objective, verifiable facts
and not on speculation.
The states' view - in which the Secretary concurred -

that Bo-

ren conferred almost unlimited discretion to formulate their own
Medicaid payment methodologies based however tightly or loosely on
whatever criteria the states deemed appropriate is reflected in a report
issued approximately five years after Boren's adoption by the General
Accounting Office. Five years after Boren was adopted, GAO studied
the states' Medicaid programs to determine how effective the states
had been in establishing prospective payment systems that provide
nursing homes an incentive to reduce costs without adversely affecting
quality of care.8 ° GAO reported that it had "identified weaknesses in
each phase of the rate-setting process. These weaknesses meant that
HCFA lacked adequate assurances that the states' reimbursement
rates were reasonable and adequate to meet the costs incurred by efficiently and economically operated nursing homes."'"
Although GAO found that all aspects of the states' rate setting
processes were flawed, a single basic flaw pervaded the process - the
Secretary had not established any guidelines identifying reimbursable
costs and the states likewise had not adopted "well-defined criteria defining allowable and unallowable costs."8 2 Moreover, in many instances, GAO found that the states had conducted no studies or
79. During this same time frame, Congress amended the Medicaid Act and other Social Security Act programs to substantially expand the scope of covered benefits and the
class of individuals eligible for such benefits. The combination of decreasing federal revenues and expanding benefits and coverage mandates put enormous pressure on state
budgets.
80. See GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 14.
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analyses to ensure that their reimbursement systems paid reasonable
rates.83 Consequently, neither the Secretary nor the states knew
"whether reimbursement rates [were] adequate to assure Medicaid
beneficiaries access to quality nursing home care."84
For example, noting that accurate base-cost data are essential in
setting payment rates, GAO nonetheless found that the base year costs
(responsible for eighty to ninety percent of payment rates) that the
states used to set payment rates were not based on audited data.85
Further, while GAO stated that "it is important that states have welldefined written criteria defining allowable and unallowable costs," the
states had left the critical decisions whether and to what extent costs
were allowable to the discretion of auditors.8 6 GAO also noted that
payment methodologies used by the states assigned nursing homes to
groups, but the states had not undertaken any studies or analyses of
the assignment criteria to ensure that the groupings reflected legitimate differences in the cost of care. 7 GAO concluded that "[t]his
resulted in reimbursement rates that may not be adequate to insure
quality care in some economically and efficiently run nursing homes,
while giving other nursing homes in the subgroup unreasonable profits." 8 GAO also found that the inflation index used by more than
one-half of the states to adjust base period costs forward twelve to
eighteen months to the rate year did not "accurately reflect[ I] the increased costs experienced by nursing homes." 9 As GAO stated,
"Is] election of an appropriate index is important ...because 50 to 60
percent of increased expenditures is due to inflation."9 Finally, GAO
noted that, in 1981 Medicaid budget shortfalls had caused two of the
states studied to reduce "reimbursement[ ] . . .rates below what the
state [s] had previously determined were needed for an efficiently and
economically operated nursing home to provide quality care." 91 Not83. See id.
84. Id. at 3.
85. See id.
86. See GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 14. In fact, noting that neither the
federal regulation nor the Secretary's Medicaid manual provided guidance regarding appropriate allowable cost criteria, GAO noted that more than one-half the states studied
continued to utilize Medicare principles. This despite the fact the states fought for Boren
to free their programs from Medicare's principles!
87. See id. at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 24. To illustrate the minimal supervision exercised by the Secretary, GAO
pointed out that, in one instance, the Secretary had approved a State Plan that limited rate
increases to a specified percentage, but that a federal district court found that the rate cap

was arbitrary and unrelated to actual cost of care. Id. at 32.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 26.
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ing that Boren's legislative history explicitly stated that the amendment did not permit "states to develop rates solely on the basis of
budgetary appropriations" GAO reported that, "[i]n both cases, [the
Secretary] accepted the states' findings and assurances that their rates
'
were reasonable and adequate. "92
Stripped to their essence, GAO's findings demonstrate that, soon
after Boren was adopted, many states were exercising discretion to set
Medicaid payment rates as they wished, were doing so without any
basis to believe that rate setting criteria, including the inflation index,
appropriately defined reasonable and legitimate allowable costs and
with so little federal oversight that the Secretary had no "basis for determining... whether the state has complied with the requirements
in the statute and regulations."9 3 GAO's conclusion that the Secretary
had freed the states, and that the states had exercised their new freedom, to set rates arbitrarily and without regard to the statutory criteria
would be echoed repeatedly by the courts.
2.

The Boren Amendment in the Courts

The irony of Boren was that one objective of the Amendment was
to decrease federal oversight of state payment Plans, but, in reality,
federal oversight was transferred from the executive to the judiciary.
To be sure, judicial intervention was not routine and the courts applied a far more lenient standard of review than the Secretary previously had. Nonetheless, as states exercised their new authority to selfvalidate their Medicaid payment Plans, providers increasingly turned
to the courts to fill the void created when Congress stripped the Secretary of authority to evaluate state compliance with the Medicaid Act's
payment standards.9 4
92. See GAO/T-HRD-86-26 Report, supra note 6, at 32.
93. Id
94. Although the states would assert that the Boren Amendment subjected them to
increased Medicaid payment litigation, GAO relatively early on both predicted the litigation and put the blame squarely on the states. GAO, based on its analysis of state Medicaid
nursing home reimbursement methodologies in the years immediately after Boren was
adopted, noted that the refusal of the Secretary and the states to adopt "well-defined written criteria defining allowable and unallowable costs," Id. at 14, made litigation inevitable.
GAO concluded that "as a result" of the failure to adopt such written criteria, "whether and
to what extent ... costs were allowable for reimbursement purposes was left to the judgment of the auditor and subject to litigation." Id.
In addition, even before Congress enacted the Boren Amendment, the courts were
routinely hearing private suits brought by providers directly under the Medicaid Act, challenging the adequacy of reimbursement. See Edgewater Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Miller, 678
F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1982) (suit directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (E), requiring payment on "reasonable cost-related basis"); Forbes Health Sys. v. Harris, 661 F.2d 282 (3d
Cir. 1981) (same); Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1980)
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a. Enforcement of the Boren Amendment by the Courts: The
Supreme Court Speaks
Prior to 1990, lawsuits were filed in at least twenty-two states alleging that state Medicaid reimbursement rates violated Boren. All of
the appellate courts which addressed the issue found that the Boren
Amendment conferred judicially enforceable rights on healthcare
providers. 5 With limited exception, these courts found that the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conferred on providers an express right
of action to enforce Boren. Notwithstanding the nearly unanimous
opinions of the appellate courts, states continued to argue that providers had no right to invoke judicial oversight of the state's compliance
with federal law.
In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,9 6 the Supreme Court resolved the question. The Supreme Court determined that Boren conferred independent procedural and substantive rights on providers.9 7
The Court held that section 1983 created an express cause of action to
enforce both the procedural and substantive rights conferred by the
Boren Amendment."
(same); California Hosp. Ass'n v. Obledo, 602 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1979) (direct suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (E) "reasonable cost" standard); Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Weiner, 569 F.2d 1156 (1st Cir. 1978) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (2001). When Congress enacted the Boren Amendment payment standard, it did not eliminate the providers'
recognized standing to sue directly under the Medicaid Act on grounds that Medicaid
payment violated the prevailing standard.
95. See Robert A. Bitterman, Civil Rights-Medicaid Law-HealthcareProviders Acquire a Federal Right under the Boren Amendment to Reasonable Medicaid Reimbursement Rates and May Enforce Their Right Under 42 U.S.C.Section 1983, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. Rrv. 659 (1992). See, e.g.,
Oregon Ass'n of Homes for the Aging, Inc. v. Oregon, 884 F. Supp. 382 (D. Ore. 1994).
96. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
97. See id. The Court was unanimous in holding that the Boren Amendment conferred
on providers an enforceable right to have payment rates established using the procedures
specified in the statute. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 527. The Court split five to four on whether
Boren created a substantive right to reasonable and adequate Medicaid payment rates. See
id. at 527-28.
98. Wilder was not the first time that the enforceability of the Boren Amendment was
before the Supreme Court. In 1987 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
question in Coos Bay Care Ctr. v. Oregon, 803 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1986). However, that case
became moot prior to argument and was dismissed. States continued to press the argument that providers had no cause of action to enforce Boren. Four years later the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in Wilder to decide the question.
Note, however, that several courts also had held that a cause of action could be implied under Boren. See, e.g., California Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 110 (C.D.
Cal. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983); Folden v. Washington State Dep't of Soc. &
Health Servs., Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
28,238 at 21,307, affd 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32, at *311 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Coos Bay Ctr. v. Oregon Dep't of Human Res.,
803 F.2d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 481 U.S. 1036 (1987), vacated, 484 U.S.
806 (1987).
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The Wilder Court noted that the Amendment required that the
state's Plan "provide for payment .. .according to rates [that] the
state finds are reasonable and adequate and to make assurances to
that effect." The Court stated: "The Boren Amendment to the [Medicaid] Act creates a right, enforceable in a private cause of action pursuant to section 1983, to have the State adopt rates that it finds are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of an efficient and economical health care provider.""9
Because the statute required a state "in the making of its findings
to judge the reasonableness of its rates against the objective benchmark of an 'efficiently and economically' operated facility providing
care in compliance with federal and state standards," the Court held
that the statute provided a yardstick by which trial courts could measure a state's compliance with federal law.' 0 0 The Court determined
that the language of the Boren Amendment was "cast in mandatory
rather than precatory terms" and "succinctly sets forth a congressional
command, which is wholly uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or
'nudge."101 According to the Court, evaluation of the state's compliance with Boren's standards was "well within the competence of the
judiciary."'0 2 Finally, the Court held that "if a State errs in finding
that its rates are reasonable and adequate . . . . then a provider is
entitled to have the court invalidate the current state plan and order
03
the state to promulgate a new plan that complies with the Act.'1
The Wilder court also held that the statute created an enforceable
substantive right to a minimum level of payment.'0 4 The Court held
that it would be meaningless "for Congress to require a state to make
findings without requiring those findings to be correct."'0 5 The Court
determined that both the plain language and legislative history of the
statute clearly demonstrated that "by requiring a state to find that its
rates were reasonable and adequate, the statute also imposed the concomitant obligation to adopt reasonable and adequate rates. "106
Finally, the Court held that Congress had not foreclosed judicial
enforcement of the Boren Amendment. The Court determined that
the plain language of the Medicaid Act did not expressly preclude a
private remedy under section 1983. The Court further held that a
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Wilder, 496 U.S. at 524.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 498.
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 499 (1990).
Id. at 520, n.18.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 515.
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federal cause of action was not implicitly precluded because the Medicaid Act contained no comprehensive administrative remedial
10 7
scheme.
b. The Boren Amendment in the Inferior Federal Courts

Virtually all of the Boren cases brought against states alleged both
a procedural violation (i.e., that the state had not made the required
finding) as well as a claim that the payment rate was not substantively
reasonable and adequate. The rulings in these cases, however, almost

always turned on whether the state had made an appropriate finding
that its payment rates complied with substantive federal payment
standards.' 0 8

After adoption of the Boren Amendment, the states tended to
give themselves the benefit of the doubt when determining whether
their State Plans complied with federal payment standards. Indeed, in

many instances, the states took Congress' admonition that the Secretary keep regulatory and other requirements to a minimum to mean
that Boren's proscriptions were mere formalities.

Thus, as GAO

found, the post Boren years saw states, often in response to state
budget pressures, attempt to manipulate nursing home payment
methodologies to reduce rates without any serious or. objective attempt to determine whether the resultant payment rates were "reasonable and adequate," or whether the costs of "economically and

efficiently operated" facilities were paid. In fact, many states appeared
to believe that the procedural component of Boren could be satisfied
simply by reciting that the required action had been taken or by doing
a perfunctory analysis of a limited or gerry-rigged data set. The

courts, however, read the findings requirement to require far more.
The courts held, for example, that the procedural component of
Boren required that the state engage in "a bona fide finding process
107. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, dissented in Wilder. Even the dissent recognized that providers had a right to force states to
adhere to the rate setting process (i.e. the findings and assurance requirements) prescribed in the statute. See id. at 527. However, the dissenters argued that allowing providers
to seek court-imposed rates would subvert the statutory process and thereby undermine
Congress' intent in passing Boren. Thus, the dissent refused to find any substantive right
for providers under Boren. See id. at 528.
108. See, e.g.,
Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 801-04 (5th Cir. 1993); Illinois
Health Care Ass'n, 983 F.2d at 1464-65; Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519,
529-31 (8th Cir. 1993); Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1313-16 (2d Cir.
1991); Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
873 (1992); Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 842 F.2d 1158,
1165-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 516-17 (5th Cir.
1983).
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and [make] assurances to the Secretary based on those findings."' 09 A
state could create its own findings process as long as the required finding was made "on the basis of some reasonably principled analysis."" 0
The courts held that the annual findings must be based on "the result[s] of careful and objective studies of cost data," 1 1' and "empirical
'
analysis [ ] [that] measure[s] the effects of the payment program. "2
These annual studies must include "quantified data and descriptive
analysis... [of] the relevant factors... [sufficient to demonstrate that
the agency] made a good faith examination of the impact" of its
ratesetting decisions. 1 ' Mere "conceptual policy decisions" do not
constitute findings." 4
The courts did not always consistently interpret the requirement
to use a bona fide findings process. For example, some courts held
that the finding could be made by establishing standards that a hypothetical efficiently and economically operated facility must satisfy, but
that the state did not need to identify specific facilities that met those
standards. 1 5 In contrast, other courts invalidated state reimbursement methodologies because states failed to identify specific facilities
that were efficiently and economically operated." 6 The courts' somewhat different articulation of the finding requirement sometimes obscured a fundamental point on which all courts agreed. The basic
109. Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990); see alsoJohn M. Burman, Judicial Review of Medicaid
Hospital and Nursing Home Reimbursement Methodologies under the Boren Amendment, 3 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 55, 79 (1994).

110. Folden v. Washington State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 981 F.2d 1054, 1057 (9th
Cir. 1992); Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1393 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
Accord Temple Univ. Hosp. v. White, 729 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 941 F.2d 201
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992); Amisub (PSL), 879 F.2d at 796-97;
Oklahoma Nursing Home Ass'n, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
40,949 at 33,98081; Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Stangler, 765 F. Supp. 1413, 1415 (W.D. Mo. 1991);
Washington Hosp. Ass'n v. Washington, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
36,352 at
14,345 (W.D. Wash. 1987); California Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 110, 117
(C.D. Cal. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983)
111. Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n, 701 F.2d at 517.
112. Temple Univ., 941 F.2d at 210.
113. Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1168; see Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Kizer, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
40,853 at 33,216, 33,218-19 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
114. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 30 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 936 (1990); Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Childers, 1995 WL 504806 at *5 (W.D. Ky.
1995) ("Informed or reasoned judgment... does not meet the standard set by the Boren
Amendment.").
115. See, e.g., Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Alaska State Hosp. & Nursing Home Ass'n,
856 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 1993). See also Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983 F.2d
1460, 1467 (7th Cir. 1993).
116. See, e.g., Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789 (10th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990).
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obligation imposed by the Act is that "l[t] he state must make findings
and
which establish a nexus between the costs of operating efficient 17
economical nursing facilities and the . . . reimbursement rates."1
Resolution of alleged procedural violations of the Boren Amendment generally disposed of a provider's entire case for two reasons.
First, failure to make the required finding and assurance resulted in
invalidation of the state's payment methodology without regard to
whether payments actually were reasonable and adequate. 18 Second,
as the Wilder court noted, the courts generally agreed that, if a state
has complied with the procedural requirements imposed by the
Amendment and regulations, a federal court would employ a deferential standard of review to evaluate whether the rates complied with the
substantive requirements of the Amendment.1 1 9
However courts articulated the test, use of a deferential standard
of review placed an almost insurmountable burden on plaintiffs attacking the adequacy of payment rates. In such a case, a provider alleging a substantive Boren violation had to prove that, in the
aggregate and on a state-wide basis, the rates that the state paid failed
to reimburse a large portion of providers for the cost of delivering
care in compliance with care standards. 2 ° The reasonableness and
adequacy of Medicaid payments to individual nursing homes, no mat117. Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Illinois
Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Supp. 411, 418-19 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affirmed, 983 F.2d
1460 (7th Cir. 1993).
118. SeeWilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 520 n.18 (1990); Abbeville
Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 801-04 (5th Cir. 1993); Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 529-31 (8th Cir. 1993); Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d
1306, 1313-16 (2d Cir. 1991); Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992); Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Mississippi Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d
511, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1983).
119. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 n. 18; Abbeville Gen. Hosp., 3 F.3d at 804. See also Temple
Univ., 941 F.2d at 209-10; Amisub (PSL), 879 F.2d at 801; West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 885 F.2d
at 24, cert. granted, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990), and later proceeding, 898 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990), affd, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v.
Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987); Mississippi
Hosp. Ass'n, 701 F.2d at 516; Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab.
Servs., 822 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 1993); Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Alaska State
Hosp. & Nursing Home Ass'n, 856 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1993). Cf Pinnacle,928 F.2d at 1313;
Illinois Health Care Ass'n, 983 F.2d at 1463 (courts advert to arbitrary and capricious standards of review where some findings exist but find Medicaid plans invalid solely due to
inadequacy of findings).
120. See Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1167; Amisub (PSL), 879 F.2d at 797;
Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F. Supp. 879, 914-15 (W.D. Tex. 1983); Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Childers, 1995 WL 504806 at *6 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (Court "should focus upon the overall
reimbursement plan and its objectives" and view "straight provisions ... in the overall
context of more generous ones.").
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ter how efficiently and economically operated, were irrelevant under
Boren. 12 1 Moreover, there was no bright line that distinguished a reasonable and adequate rate from one that was unreasonable. 12 2 Instead, the provider had to prove that the state's payment rates fell
outside of a "zone of reasonableness." 123 The breadth of the zone of
121. Bethesda Found. of Nebraska v. Dep't of Health Care Pol'y, 902 P.2d 863 (Colo.
1995) is a particularly extreme example of the principle discussed in the text. Plaintiff,
Bethesda Foundation, appealed its Medicaid payment through the administrative process.
The administrative law judge found, and the court did not disagree, that "plaintiffs overall
operation of the nursing home was efficient and economical." Id. at 866. According to the
ALJ, the Colorado Medicaid system was not designed to account for or adequately pay the
reasonable costs of services provided to such patients. Id. The court held that:
Underlying the position adopted by the ALJ and the district court is the premise
that, under Medicaid, it is inefficiently or economically operated. That premise
has been rejected on numerous occasions to ....
It is the overall payment for all
nursing facilities in a particular classification that is evaluated for statutory compliance for establishing reimbursement compensation rather than the adequacy
of payment for any one component or single facility.
Id. (citations omitted). Notwithstanding the court's assertion to the contrary, the Boren
Amendment explicitly states that medicaid rates must pay the costs incurred by an efficiently and economically operated facility. Further, the Amendment's implementing regulations confirm that an administrative exception process, such as that discussed in Bethesda,
must be available to assure that costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated
facilities would be paid, even if the state's general reimbursement principles would not
routinely do so. See 48 FED. REG. 56046, 56050, 56052 (Dec. 18, 1983). Cf Amisub (PSL),
879 F.2d at 747 (requiring state to identify efficiently and economically operated providers
and to pay costs of service incurred by such providers); Children's Memorial Hosp. v. Dep't
of Pub. Aid, 562 F. Supp.. 165, 173 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (application of payment methodology
based on average patient population to hospital with unique mix and intensity of service is
unrelated to efficiency and economy); Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Childers, 1995 WL 504806
at *11 (W.D. Ky. 1995) ("The Court believes that the Administrative Appeals process is a
legitimate and workable procedure for considering individual inequities."). Nevertheless,
Bethesda Foundationis indicative of the extent of deference sometimes accorded Medicaid
agencies when the substantive validity of a payment rate was questioned.
122. See ColoradoHealth Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1169; 1983 Medicaid Program, supra note
49, at 56,049.
123. Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 1993); Lett v. Magnant,
965 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1992), citing West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 26
(3d Cir. 1989), affd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v.
Revitz, 820 F.2d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 1988); Hillhaven Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and
Social Servs., 733 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1984).
In practice, the "zone of reasonableness" sometimes was defined by a surrogate that
demonstrates the extensive margin of error allowed the states. The surrogate focused on
the percentage of all nursing homes paid less than their costs. For example, if a substantial
portion of nursing homes - generally more than fifty percent - did not receive rates
covering their actual costs, both HCFA and the courts were likely to find a violation of the
Boren Amendment. See Health Care Ass'n of Michigan v. Babcock, Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 39,182 at 26,105-06 (W.D. Mich. 1991). In theory, the fifty percent rule of
thumb reflected the common sense judgment that it is highly unlikely that more than onehalf the state's nursing homes were uneconomical or inefficient. Thus, HCFA refused to
approve state plans that failed to reimburse more than fifty percent of a state's providers
for the actual costs of delivering Medicaid services. See, e.g., Health Care Financing Admin-
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reasonableness, the difficulty of establishing an aggregate, statewide
shortfall and the presumption of regularity attached to agency decisions virtually precluded proof of a substantive violation.

istration Notice of Hearing, 55 Fed. Reg. 1518, 1519 (Jan. 16, 1990) (notice of hearing
concerning disapproval of Colorado state plan's reimbursement methodology); Health
Care Financing Administration Notice of Hearing, 55 Fed. Reg. 7034 (Feb. 28, 1990) (Louisiana state plan disapproved even though sixty percent were paid costs); Health Care Financing Administration Notice of Hearing, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,873 (Nov. 7, 1990) (Missouri
plan amendment disapproved because substantial number of providers would not recover
full actual cost). Cf Thomas, 557 F. Supp. at 914-15 (Boren Amendment violated because
sixty percent were not reimbursed their costs); Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n v. Oklahoma Dep't
of Human Servs., Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 33, 057 at 10,249-50 (W.D. Okla.
1983) (substantial likelihood of violation where forty percent of providers were not being
reimbursed their costs); Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1169 (no violation where
reimbursement ceiling at ninetieth percentile of costs); Mississippi Hosp. Ass', Inc., 701
F.2d at 517-18 (no violation where reimbursement at eightieth percentile of costs).
There is no statute or regulation that provides that compliance with the Boren
Amendment may be evaluated by comparing the percentage of providers paid their costs
against the percentage not paid their costs. Use of a comparative percentage test to evaluate compliance with Boren was never [explicitly] established or endorsed by HCFA. There
is nothing in the legislative history of Boren suggesting that a Medicaid program satisfies
the Act's payment requirements if some percentage of providers are paid the cost of delivering care. There is no study, analysis or investigation that validates the proposition that
payment of the costs of service incurred by a specified percentage of providers assures
payment of the costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated providers. Yet
many, perhaps most, judicial and administrative decisions base their determination of a
state's compliance with the Act on whether some percentage of facilities - usually fifty
percent or more - recover the cost of providing Medicaid services.
In contrast, courts rebuffed attempts to justify payment rates adopted under the reasonable cost related standard by pointing to the percentage of providers paid the cost of
service. For example, in Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n, the court noted that "Congress intended that states have freedom both to define allowable cost items and to set a value on
the reasonable cost of such items," but found that the Secretary had failed "to perform
[her] statutory and regulatory duties" where a Medicaid plan was approved because it paid
the cost of service incurred by sixty percent of providers. The court held that the Secretary
"never attempted to verify that the sixtieth percentile ceiling would, in fact, result in reasonable cost related reimbursement," never required the state to submit "documentation
or analysis showing that the plan's.., reimbursement rate fell within the maximum and
minimum allowable rates" and never conducted "an independent study or analysis to ensure that the [state's] plan complied with the statutory requirement." 617 F.2d at 394
(footnote omitted). Instead, the court held that the Secretary had approved the plan based
solely on "the application of the agency's institutional assumption that any plan that reimburses at or above the projected billing rate of the median facility in a class meets the
regulatory minimum reimbursement rate. The application of such an assumption does
not satisfy the requirements of § 1396a(a) (13) (E)." Id.
The discretion granted the states after Boren was so broad that courts never questioned the comparison of the percentage of providers paid their costs versus those not paid
and no court ever demanded that a state Medicaid agency validate its decision to reimburse specific percentiles of cost through studies and analysis, as the Fifth Circuit had
demanded the Secretary do. To the contrary, after Boren, the states were permitted to do
exactly what the Secretary had been denied permission to do, i.e.,justify Medicaid payment
rates by "institutional assumption."
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THE REPEAL OF THE BOREN AMENDMENT

The Wilder decision effectively ended the states' hope that their
Medicaid rate setting decisions would be insulated from oversight. In
fact, despite the Wilder court's sharp disagreement over the existence
of a substantive right to reasonable and adequate payment, there was
unanimity that Boren conferred an enforceable right to have payment
rates determined using a bona fide findings process. 124 Wilder put the
states on notice that the discretion conferred by Boren was not unlimited. Further, Wilder put the states on notice that the courts would
assure that payment rates were adopted on an objective, principled
basis.
Ironically, however, Wilder's holding that providers could enforce
Boren in the courts also ultimately led to the Amendment's repeal.
The decision in Wilder came at a time when Congress was increasing
financial pressure on the states by expanding benefits that state welfare programs were required to offer and by lowering the thresholds
for eligibility.' 2 5 At the same time, health care costs for institutional
as well as other types of care were increasing rapidly due to inflation,
the advent of new technology and, especially in nursing homes, increases in the intensity of service required to satisfy patient needs as
well as heightened regulatory scrutiny.12 6
124. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 498 (1990).
125. In the years immediately prior to 1990, "Congress expanded Medicaid coverage by
mandating that states serve certain low-income groups and provide certain services. GAO/
HEHS 95-122 Report, supra note 1, at 27. The number of persons served by Medicaid
continued to increase at about eleven percent per year through the early 1990's, but Medicaid costs increased even faster, at more than fifteen percent per year. Id. at 26-35. These
federal mandates required that state Medicaid programs cover "additional low-income
pregnant women, children and Medicare beneficiaries." The mandates also required that
Medicaid provide coverage for families no longer eligible for benefits under certain welfare programs, for severely impaired individuals under sixty-five years of age and for chronically ill or disabled individuals. Id. at 27-28. It was estimated that the mandates added
about six million individuals to the Medicaid rolls nationwide, between 1990 and 1992.
The number of persons covered by Medicaid continued to increase in the next years at
about eleven percent per year. Id. at 26. However, Medicaid costs increased even faster, at
about fifteen percent per year. This increase is explained, in part, by the facts that, although the poor, elderly and disabled accounted for only one-fourth of Medicaid beneficiaries, such individuals incurred about sixty-six percent of Medicaid expenditures. Id. at
19.
126. From 1975 to 1985, the number of long-term care Medicaid recipients rose slightly
- from 1.4 million to 1.5 million, while the programs's total funding nearly quadrupled,
from 4.7 billion to 16.3 billion dollars in the same decade. According to HCFA figures,
there were 1.7 billion long-term care Medicaid recipients in 1993, but the federal bill for
long-term care totaled 34.2 billion dollars. At the same time, long term care's portion of
the budget has been increasing. In 1970 long term care made up twenty-five percent of
the national Medicaid budget. In 1995, long term care constituted more than one-third of
Medicaid spending. Similarly, in 1970, 7.4 percent of the United States' income (GDP)
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Changes in the way that nursing home care was delivered illustrate one of the reasons that the cost of care increased. At just about
the same time that Wilder was decided, Congress, by statute, changed
the standard of care required of nursing homes.' 2 7 By statute Congress dictated that "[a] nursing facility must provide services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and
psychosocial well-being of each resident .... "128 The statute also effectively elevated the patient's mental and psychosocial needs to a status co-equal with medical and nursing needs. Moreover, enforcement
of the new standards focused on the quality of care provided to each
resident, not the care delivered generally by the facility and, further,
employed a "zero tolerance" philosophy.1 29 Both the Secretary and
Congress recognized that the new requirement would be costly and
required that the states increase Medicaid payments to cover the in1 30
creased cost of care.

was devoted to health care. In 1995, health care constituted fourteen percent of GDP. See
A Policy Inst. of the Gerontological Soc'y of America, THE PUBLIC POLICY AND AGING REPORT,
NATIONAL ACADEMY ON AGING, (Nov. 1995), available at http://gsa.iog.wayne.edu/NAA/
ppl.html. See also GAO/HEHS 95-122 at 33. See also GAO/HEHS 95-122 Report, supra
note 1, at 33.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b) (2000).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(2) (2000). HCFA's Interpretive Guidelines, which govern
certification inspections of facilities under federal law, define "highest practicable" as
the highest level of functioning and well-being possible, limited only by the ...
individual's presenting functional status and potential for improvement or reThe facility must ensure that the resident
duced rate of functional decline ....
obtains optimal improvement or does not deteriorate within the limits of a resident's right to refuse treatment, and within the limits of recognized pathology
and normal aging process.
Transmittal 250, supra note 19. HCFA's Interpretive Guidelines identify only two limitations on each facility's obligation, under the highest practicable standard, to obtain "optimal" resident improvement or lack of deterioration: (1) a resident's right to refuse
treatment; and (2) recognized pathology and the normal aging process. Id.
129. The new enforcement philosophy included a variety of new "remedies" for noncompliance including civil money penalties of up to $10,000 per day. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396t
(2000); 42 C.F.R. § 488.430 (2001).
130. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-391(I) (1987). Commenting on the OBRA 1987 reforms, the House Budget Committee noted that Medicaid State Plan amendments must
assure that state payment rates actually take into account the costs of complying with the new
requirements." Id. at 464 (emphasis supplied). The Committee continued:
Quality care is not free. A number of these requirements will entail additional costs of
operationfor nursingfacilitiesparticipatingin Medicaid. The Committee amendment
would therefore require that, with respect to complying facilities, state Medicaid
payment rates take into account the costs of complying with the requirements
relating to provision of services, residents' rights, and administration.
The committee amendment would mandate significant additionalrequirements for many
State Medicaid nursing home programs. It is the intent of the Committee that the
States'Medicaid programs provide for an adjustment (in their Medicaid plan) and
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The cost of nursing home care was escalating at precisely the
same time that states were obliged to fund a variety of new and expanded welfare programs. t3 Faced with a choice between increasing
state taxes to fund the new federal mandates or reallocating existing
dollars, many states chose to decrease state funding of long term
care.13 2 Encouraged by Wilder and compelled by this combination of
make payments commensurate to the cost incurredby the providers in implementing
the new requirements .
Id. at 463-64 (emphasis added).
The House Energy and Commerce Committee estimated that additional state and federal Medicaid expenditures attributable to nursing home reforms would approximate one
billion dollars in fiscal years 1988-90, with roughly 447 million dollars representing federal
expenditures. Id. at 542-43. The House Ways and Means Committee noted that the reforms would increase overall Medicare program outlays by seventy-five million dollars for
the same period. Id. at 1655. These estimates also took into account that many OBRA
1987 requirements were being phased in during and after this period.
The 1990 modification of § 1396a(a) (13) (A) was yet an additional step by Congress to
assure that states provide adequate reimbursement for facility compliance with reform provisions, as Congress had envisioned in 1987. Entitled "assurance of appropriate payment
amounts," the 1990 Amendment was characterized by the House Budget Committee as
follows:
Assurance of appropriatepayment amounts. - As this Committee recognized in the
report to accompany the House Budget Committee's 1987 Budget Reconciliation
Amendments, quality nursing home care is not without cost .... The Committee
anticipated then - as it does today that a number of the reforms contained
within OBRA 1987 will entail additional costs of operation for nursing facilities
participating in Medicaid.
In order to assure that Medicaid State payment rates allow for these additional
costs, OBRA 1987 requires that, for those Medicaid nursing facilities in compliance with the law, such rates must take into account the costs of meeting the
statute's requirements relating to the provision of services, residents' rights, and
administration. To ensure that State Medicaid payments actually take these costs
into consideration, OBRA 1987 also requires that each State submit to the Secretary (by April 1 of each fiscal year), a State Plan amendment to provide for an
appropriate adjustment in payment amounts for nursing facility services furnished on or after October 1, 1990....
The Committee bill clarifies that State Medicaid plan amendments must include a
detailed description of the State methodology used in determining the appropriate adjustment in the payment amounts for nursing facility services. In addition,
the bill specifies that these costs include the costs of services required to attain or
maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of
each resident.
H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 120 (1990). HCFA, for its part, has been less than vigilant in
policing the states' adherence to these financial requirements. See American Health Care
Ass'n v. Bowen, 1991 WL 154456 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Erie County Geriatric Ctr. v. Sullivan,
952 F.2d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 1991); Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997); GAO/T-HRD-86-26
Report, supra note 6, at 29-33.
131. See supra note 125.
132. The long term care component of the state Medicaid budget was as obvious a target for reallocation or cutting as it was attractive because it was one of the largest components of the state budget. Many states made plain their intention to cut Medicaid spending
with or without Congressional action. See Patricia Riley, Long Term Care: The Silent Target of
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decreasing funding and increasing costs, many hospitals and nursing
homes resorted to the courts to resolve Medicaid payment disputes.
Increasingly, the courts were being asked to fill the role previously

held by the Secretary - i.e., to validate the states' assurance that it
had adopted Medicaid payment standards using the required findings
process and in compliance with the substantive payment standards established by federal law.
The forum in which the states fought the battle over the right to
set Medicaid payment rates without federal oversight shifted from the
judiciary to the legislature. The states began to develop and pursue a
legislative agenda that characterized Boren's guarantee of reasonable
and adequate payment as an example of the type of federal mandate
that resulted in unwarranted and excessive state expenditures. In the
mid 1990's the states' pleas for relief from Boren's mandates began to
fall on receptive ears as Congress searched for ways to cut federal
spending, balance the federal budget and disentangle the federal government from local political and spending decisions.
Repeal of Boren was championed by the National Governors Association (NGA). NGA's bipartisan effort was led by Governor Bob
Miller, a Democrat from Nevada, and by then Governor, and now Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, a Republican from Wisconsin. NGA argued that Boren kept Medicaid payment
rates artificially high by denying the states fiscal discretion to control
costs and by preventing the states from taking advantage of open-market competition. 131 In a policy statement issued in [February 1996]
for example, NGA, in addition to urging that "the Boren Amendment
and other Boren-like statutory provisions must be repealed," argued
that "[s] tates must have maximum flexibility in the design and implementation of cost-effective systems of care."1'34 According to the NGA,
[s] tates must have complete authority to set all health plan and provider reimbursement rates without interference from the federal government or threat of legal action of the provider or plan." '
NGA
not only argued that the courts ought not be able to enforce the Medithe Federal and State Budget Debate, Pub. Pol'y and Aging Report, NAT'L ACADEMY ON AGING 9,
(Nov. 24, 1997), available at http://gsa.iog.wayne.eud/NAA/ppl.html [hereinafter Silent
Target]. The Medicaid program, as a whole, constituted nineteen percent of all state
spending. Medicaid spending ranked second only to elementary and secondary education
as the largest state budget item. See id. Moreover, fifty-nine percent of Medicaid dollars
were spent on long term care for the elderly and disabled. See id.
133. See Alice Ann Love, Nursing Home Medicaid Cuts Ok'd, AP ONLINE, (Aug. 15, 1997).
134. Memorandum from American Health Care Association to AHCA State Affiliate Executives 1 (Feb. 7, 1996) (on file with author).
135. Id.
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caid Act's requirements at the behest of providers, the governors also
sought to "streamline" the plan amendment and approval process and
"to assure that federal intervention occurs only when a state fails to
comply substantially with federal statutes or its own plan."' 3 6 Instead
of acknowledging the widespread care problems that Congress had
found attributable to inadequate Medicaid payment for nursing facility services when the states last exercised similar discretion to set payment rates free of secretarial and judicial oversight, NGA proposed to
define such problems out of existence. Specifically, while the governors advocated maintenance of the quality of care standards added to
the Medicaid Act by OBRA '87, NGA urged that the states be given
"flexibility to determine enforcement strategies for nursing home
standards."'3 7 On February 4, 1997, the NGA unanimously adopted
The Governors' Agenda for the 105th Congress. Most importantly,
the NGA urged the repeal of the Boren Amendment, and sought
greater state flexibility in establishing managed care networks and
controlling Medicaid eligibility standards and benefits by repealing
Medicaid waiver requirements." 8
The states' claims that they were denied discretion to administer
their Medicaid programs by the Act generally and by the Boren
Amendment, specifically, were largely illusory. Section 249, the reasonable cost related reimbursement provision, specifically guaranteed
the states discretion to develop their own payment methodologies.
Boren went further and permitted the states to develop and to validate their payment methodologies. Further, the states even were authorized to define the terms of federal law that would be used to test
the adequacy of Medicaid payments. Moreover, a state's determination that it had complied with federal law, if based on reasoned analysis of'objective data normally established conclusively the state's right
to hundreds of millions of federal dollars.
The broad discretion to determine Medicaid payments to institutional providers actually possessed by the states was noted by numerous commentators. For example, it has been pointed out that the
legislation extending the Boren Amendment to hospital reimbursement was "grounded in Regan's New Federalism" and "provided new
and expansive discretion to the states" that enabled the states "to un136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, INC., Health Line, August 15, 1997; Center on

Budget and Policy Priorities, Medicaid and Child Health Provisions of the Bipartisan Budget
Agreement, (May 28, 1997) available at http://www.cbpp.org/mcaidbud.htm [hereinafter
CBPP Paper].
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dertake unique and narrowly tailored approaches to their health care
problems."' 9 Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office rejected the
states' claims that the Medicaid program unduly constrained their discretion, opining that the states have "a great deal of flexibility" under
current law.' 4 ° The Report notes that the states "set reimbursement
rates to providers and have broad discretion over the amount, duration, and scope of the services provided. That flexibility fosters a great
deal of variation among state programs." CBO summarized its conclusions: "Medicaid spending levels are determined primarily by state
choices, not by federal requirements ...

14

Although some states moved almost immediately following repeal
of Boren to cut nursing home payments, 4 2 the states overstated the
fiscal impact of the repeal of the Boren Amendment. The National
Governors' Association estimated that cuts in nursing home payments
alone would amount to six to eight billion dollars over four to five
years.1 4 This amount represented almost one-half the total Medicaid
savings sought by congressional leaders.1 44 However, during the debate on repeal, the Congressional Budget Office determined that the
Governors' estimate was a gross exaggeration because the states currently exercised "broad discretion" and "flexibility" that was already
implicitly incorporated in federal spending projections. Consequently, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the Governors' proposal would lead to 2.9 billion dollars in federal Medicaid
savings - less than one-half the amount projected by the NGA.' 4 5
In addition, to the extent that statutory limits or state discretion
actually constrained the states, such limits were routinely set aside.
The federal government was waiving Medicaid Act requirements and
permitting states to adopt novel and creative financial mechanisms at
an unprecedented pace. In fact, the Clinton Administration approved
139. Jocelyn M. Johnston, The Medicaid Mandates of the 1980s: An IntergovernmentalPerspecBUDGETING & FINANCE, Spring 1997, at 1, 3-34.
140. See CBPP Paper, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. See Homes Assail Repeal of Their Shield Against Cuts, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Aug. 16,
1997, at 24. [hereinafter Homes Assail Repeal]. Kentucky, for example, proposed a twentyeight million dollar cut in aggregate nursing home payments. The cut was estimated to
mean a seven dollar reduction in per patient per diem payment rates.
143. See Homes Assail Repeal, supra note 142; see also CBPP Paper, supra note 138.
144. See id.
145. CBO's estimate was even lower - 1.2 billion dollars over the period from 19982002. About forty percent of the savings would come from payments to hospitals and sixty
percent from payments to nursing homes. See id. CBO also estimated that five billion
federal dollars could be saved over seven years by repealing the Boren Amendment. See
Silent Target, supra note 132.

tive, PUB.

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw

& POLICY

[VOL. 4:159

was accused of effecting a de facto
so many waivers that the Secretary
14 6
amendment of the Act.
To the extent that the states' discretion had been restricted by
the so called federal mandates adopted during the 1980's, those restrictions limited the states' discretion to define eligibility and covered
services, not to specify reimbursement rates. 4 7 In reality, the states'
objection to Boren was the same objection that had been at the heart
of the states' opposition to Boren's predecessor - the statute permitted the states' compliance with federal law to be reviewed and verified
by an independent third party, i.e., by the courts, thereby stifling the
states ability to set Medicaid payment rates without reasoned, objective
analysis of the costs of providing care. Moreover, the states objected
to Boren because in many instances, the courts held that the state had
adopted their Medicaid payment methodologies without satisfying
even the minimal demands made by Boren. The states' persistent refusal to comply with Boren resulted in a dismal record in the courts,
leading the General Accounting Office, in 1995, to conclude:
Provider suits brought under the Boren Amendment, 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(13), have been a major factor pressuring
states to increase payment rates .... Particularly in recent
146. See Janet Lewis Greene, Community Health Centers Say Medicaid Waivers Allow Too
Much Managed Care, 7 MANAGED CARE L. OUTLOOK 6, (July 19, 1994).
147. See generallyJocelyn M. Johnston, The Medicaid Mandates of the 1980's: An Intergovernmental Perspective, PUB. BUDGETING & FINANCE, Spring 1997, at 3-34. [hereinafter Johnston].
Some even have argued that "[d]espite some of the rhetoric about federal mandates, states
have voluntarily decided to provide most, if not all, the optional benefits covered under
Medicaid." Robert B. Friedland, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Budget, 7 PUB. POL'Y AND AGING
REP. OF THE NAT'L AACD. ON AGING 1 (Nov. 1995), available at http://gsa.iog.wayne.edu/
NAA/ppl.html.
The irony behind this fact ought not go unnoticed. Prior to the 1980's, the states had
discretion to determine individual eligibility standards for coverage and the medical services that would be provided to Program beneficiaries. The appeal to limit state discretion
by mandating eligibility standards and covered services came from the states. As has been
noted:
By the middle of the 1980s, a number of state leaders, most from the southeastern
U.S., had become increasingly concerned about the deterioration of health care
services for poor women and children. This concern led directly to a series of
federal Medicaid legislative efforts designed to enhance coverage of poor women
and children, and to further reduce the extent to which states differed in their
treatment of poor women and children.
The decade of Medicaid mandates began with OBRA 1981, which reduced federal Medicaid matching rates for the states for three years and reduced AFDC
eligibility thresholds across the states. OBRA-shaped by the early Reagan administration embraced the "New Federalism" ideals of enhanced state autonomy.
Id. By the end of the decade, the Governors had reversed course entirely and now blamed
the mandates for most of the state's fiscal ills. See generally id.

2001]

FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR

QuALITY

NURSING CARE

193

years, states have been dogged by provider lawsuits forcing
them to better justify or raise their
Medicaid payment rates
1 48
to hospitals and nursing homes.
Stated differently, the states sought repeal of Boren because they
wanted the authority to spend more than two hundred billion federal
Medicaid dollars without a concomitant obligation to adhere to any
federal standards when doing so.
Not surprisingly, the states never mentioned the fiscal crises and
quality of care debacles that had occurred the last time that the statute
afforded the states discretion to set payment rates without oversight.
The impact on the quality of care was, however, a primary concern for
those responsible for delivering the care and for nursing home residents.1 4 9 The call for reduction in Medicaid payment rates abated as
tax revenue grew along with the economy and many states experienced budget surpluses in the 1990's.
When the economy turned downward and slipped into recession,
tax revenues likewise declined and many states have either made
budget cuts or announced plans to do so. 15 0 After the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the deterioration in the fiscal conditions has
accelerated and, as unemployment rises, tax revenues have declined
while the Medicaid rolls began to swell, further increasing pressure on
already burdened state budgets. 151 The prominence in state budgets
of Medicaid (on average twenty percent of total state spending), especially the long term care component, made Medicaid programs, generally, and long term care specifically, obvious targets for state
spending reductions.
Thus, in late 2001, state Medicaid directors and budget officials
in twenty states reported gubernatorial directions to reduce current
148. GAO/HEHS 95-122 Report, supra note 1, at 53.
149. The impact on quality will not be obvious immediately. As has been noted:
Over time though, undercutting Medicaid will inevitably translate into a lower
quality of care for Title XIX patients. Providers do have the option to refuse
Medicaid patients and for those who have an alternative patient base, opting out
of the program could result from over-eager rate-cutting. For those who stay in,
the need to "cost shift" to other patient's billing will no doubt intensify as Medicaid rates fall way below the cost of care. For state taxpayers whose insurance
costs go up due to cost-shifting, the benefit of state Medicaid cuts will be illusory.
These negative trends though will take time to surface as countervailing political
forces. In the meantime, the critics and complainers of Boren will have their day
to dance on its grave.
Joseph D. Courtney, The Boren Amendment R.LP., CONN. L. TmUB., Sept. 22, 1997. See also
Homes Assail Repeal supra note 142, at 24; Terese Hudson, Medicaid: Will the Public Program
Neglect the Poor to Pay for the Elderly?, Hosp. AND HEALTH NETWORKS, May 20, 1995, at 28.

150. See Policy Brief supra note 1, at 1-2.
151. See id.
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(fiscal year 2002) year Medicaid spending below the level authorized
by the legislature. 152 Further, the vast majority of states began seeking
"ways to address Medicaid spending issues without cutting back on
eligibility or benefits for beneficiaries." Against this background it is
not surprising that, by late 2001, "[a]bout one-third of the States
adopted or proposed freezes or actual reductions in provider
payments.'

1 53

A.

The Replacement Legislation

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 repealed the Boren Amendment in its entirety. 5 4 The Act replaced Boren with a requirement
that states use a public process to set rates.155 Ostensibly, the public
process provides the opportunity for participation by health care providers and by Medicaid beneficiaries. The language of the new statute
is as follows:
(13) provide

-

(A) for a public process for determination of rates of
payment under the plan for hospital services, nursing
facility services, and services of intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded under which (i) proposed rates, the methodologies underlying the
establishment of such rates, and justifications for the
proposed rates are published,
(ii) providers, beneficiaries and their representatives,
and other concerned State residents are given a reasonable opportunity for review and comment on the proposed rates, methodologies, and justifications,
(iii) final rates, the methodologies underlying the establishment of such rates, and justification for such final rates are published, and
(iv) in the case of hospitals, such rates take into account (in a manner consistent with section 1923) the
situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate
15 6
number of low-income patients with special needs.
Where Boren had required states to find and assure that payment
rates were reasonable and adequate to permit providers to satisfy quality of care standards, the new legislation only requires the federal gov152.
153.
154.
(1997).
155.
156.

See id. at 5.
Medicaid Budgets, supra note 1, at 29.
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712(c), 111 Stat. 509
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (2000).
See id.
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ernment to study the "effect on access to, and the quality of, services
provided to beneficiaries" of the rate setting methods used by the
states.1 57 The results of the study are to be reported to Congress
158
within four years.
In short, Boren was replaced by a statute that contained no substantive payment standard and one that did not even require that the
state consider the impact of its rate setting decisions on the ability to
deliver quality care or to comply with state and federal care standards.
Moreover, the replacement statute did not provide even the limited
administrative oversight encompassed in Boren's assurance requirement. As a result, the statute appears to authorize the states to spend
billions of federal dollars without any federal administrative
59
oversight.1
Indeed, the purpose to preclude federal oversight is evident in
the legislative history. Discussing the proposed Boren repeal, the
Budget Reconciliation Recommendations of the Committee on Finance 160 notes that "in several states, providers and provider organizations challenged state policies in federal courts alleging that the
state's procedures for reimbursement violated requirements of the
Boren amendments. '16 1 The Recommendations continued: "following a Supreme Court decision [Wilder] that the amendments created
enforceable rights for providers, a number of courts found that state
systems failed to meet the test of 'reasonableness' and some states had
to increase payments to these providers."' 6 2 Thus, the House Report

157. See Medicaid Budgets, supra note 1, at 29.
158. See id.
159. The full extent of the unfettered discretion Congress believed that it was conferring on the state is evident in the dialogue in the Congressional Record. After a proposal
to reinstate the Boren Amendment was defeated, a compromise amendment was offered.
The compromise would have "simply require[d] that the states provide assurance to the
Secretary that the rates will be actuarially sufficient to ensure adequate care." 143 CONG.

REc. S6301-02, *$6305 (1997) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). Even this standard was rejected in the name of state flexibility. See id.
160. See Budget Reconciliation Recommendations of the Committee on Finance, 105th Cong. 95
(1997).
161. Id.
162. Legislators blamed the escalation in payments to nursing homes on the courts. For
example, Senator William Roth, one of the most vocal opponents of Boren, contended:
The Boren amendment, for example, has been used to actually bid the price of
nursing home care up higher. Between 1980 and 1985, Medicaid payments for
nursing home care increased by an average of 7.8 percent annually. In 1989,
payments had increased by 8.8 percent from the previous year. But after a key
Supreme Court decision on the Boren amendment in 1990, Medicaid payments
for nursing home care increased by 17 percent in 1991.
141 CONG. REc. S18693 (1995). See also 143 CONG. REc. S7738 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Abraham). The argument, of course, ignores: (1) other influences on costs; and (2) the
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accompanying the new legislation sought to permit continued over-

sight by the Courts. The Report states that it was the "Committee's
intention that, following enactment of this Act, neither this nor any
other provision of section 1902 will be interpreted as establishing a
cause of action for hospitals and nursing facilities relative to the adequacy of the rates they receive."' 63 The state of nursing home care
during the first ten years of the Medicaid program when states had the
same discretionary authority that they sought again with the repeal of
the Boren Amendment was largely ignored.
In contrast, the minority felt that Boren's "reasonable and adequate" payment standard was crucial to ensuring that there be no
return to the conditions that existed before the 1987 nursing home
reforms. Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), for example, warned that repealing the Boren Amendment would mean a return to "warehousing" the
elderly, and "disgraceful" nursing conditions which previously
existed.' 6 4
Fortunately, for all concerned, the economic expansion the
United States enjoyed through the 1990's blunted the immediate fiscal impact of the repeal.
IV.

POSSIBLE STATUTORY CLAIMS AFTER THE REPEAL OF
THE BOREN AMENDMENT

At the time that repeal of the Boren Amendment was moving
through Congress there was widespread belief that passage of the repeal would leave nursing facilities without a statutory basis on which to
predicate claims for adequate payment. This belief ignored the text
and history of the Medicaid Act.
The Boren Amendment and its predecessors had provided special payment standards and plan approval procedures for State Plan
fact that, with perhaps an isolated exception, no federal court ever ordered a state to increase Medicaid payment rates. Others pointed out that despite the increase in payment
rates, Medicaid had constrained further increases because, on the average, Medicaid already paid less than the cost of services. Robert B. Friedland, Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Budget, 7 PuB. POL'Y AND AGING REP. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMY ON AGING 1 (Nov. 1995),

available at http://gsa.iog.wayne.edu/NAA/ppl.html; 145 CONG. REc. S6163-74 (1997)
(statement of Sen. Milkulski) (Maryland Medicaid paid nursing homes on average of 78
dollars per day, but care cost an average of 112 dollars per day).
163. H.R. REP. No. 105-149 (1997). See also Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v.
Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 919 n.12 (5th Cir. 2000) (Congress sought to preclude lawsuits contesting adequacy of Medicaid payment.)
164. See Medicine & Health, Vol. 51, No. 24, June 16, 1997. See also 143 CONG. REC.
S6,163-74 (1997) (statement of Sen. Milkulski); 142 CONG. REc. H4,569, 4,574, 4,586
(1997); 143 CONG. REC. E1361 (June 27, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coyne); 143 CONG. REC.
H2968-69 (May 20, 1997) (statement of Rep. Cardin).
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provisions specifying the states' Medicaid payment methodology and
standards for hospital and nursing home care. However, the Amendment never was the exclusive statutory basis for a payment claim. The
statute contains a variety of provisions that long have provided a basis
for challenging inadequate Medicaid payment rates. In fact, the NGA
position paper regarding Medicaid reform explicitly acknowledges
that other provisions of the Act have been held to establish enforceable reimbursement standards. 16 5 Arguably, repeal of the Boren
Amendment's special rules remands State Plan provisions specifying
provider payment methodologies to the same substantive and procedural requirements the Act applies to all other State Plan provisions.
Thus, the Medicaid Act without the Boren Amendment arguably provides several bases on which providers might predicate claims for appropriate and adequate reimbursement.
A.

Repeal of the Boren Amendment Subjects the Provider Payment
Provisions of State Medicaid Plans to the Substantive and
ProceduralRequirements Applicable to All Other
Plan Provisions

The Medicaid Act imposes on the Secretary an obligation to review and approve state Medicaid Plans. Section 1901 provides, in pertinent part, "[the sums made available under this section shall be used
for making payments to states which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State Plans for medical assistance."1 6' 6 Section 1902 provides that the Secretary may approve a State Plan if, but
only if, he determines that the "plan .. .fulfills the conditions specified in the Act."1 67
The conditions that the State Plan must satisfy in order to obtain
the Secretary's approval and qualify for federal funding are set out in
the statute.1 68 The Plan provisions that must be approved by the Secretary fall into three general categories: (1) provisions regarding administration of the Plan; (2) provisions regarding the scope and
quality of services delivered by providers and suppliers; and (3) provision regarding payments.
Section 1902 (a) (4) (A), for example, provides that a State Plan
must "provide... such methods of administration... as are found by
the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of
165. Nat'l Governors' Assoc., NGA Pol'y Index page: EC-7 Long-Term Care, available at
http://www.nga.org/Pubs/Policies/EC/ec08.asp.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2000).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(a) (2000).
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the plan .
"..."169 In addition, the Act requires that the State Plan
include "descriptions of... [the standards and methods that the State
will use to assure that medical or remedial care and services provided
to recipients of medical assistance of are high quality."' 7 ° Further,
the Act provides the State Plan must "provide such safeguards as may
be necessary to assure that. . . such care and services will be provided,
in a matter consistent with simplicity of administration and the best
interest of the recipients .... 171
The nature and scope of the state's obligation to pay for services
continues to be explicitly defined in the Act. The Act provides that a
State Plan for medical assistance must:
provide such methods and procedures relating to . . .the
payment for, care and services available under the plan.., as
may be necessary ... to assure that payments are consistent
with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are
available under the plan at least to the extent that such care
and services are available to the general population in the

geographic area ..

172

Thus, section 1902 (a) (30) (A) provides that the State Plan must satisfy
five specific requirements regarding payment for services: (1) the
State Plan must provide payment methods and procedures; (2) the
methods and procedures must be adequate to assure that payments
are consistent with efficiency; (3) the methods and procedures must
assure that payments are consistent with economy; (4) the methods
and procedures must assure that payments are consistent with quality
of care; and (5) the methods and procedures must assure that payments are sufficient to enlist sufficient providers so that care and services are available to program beneficiaries to the same extent that
1 73
they are available to the general population.
Section 1902 (a) (62) provides that the Secretary can approve a
State Plan only if the Plan "fulfills the conditions specified" in the

169.
170.
171.
172.

42
42
42
42

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

1396a(a)(4) (2000).
1396a(a) (22) (D) (2000).
1396a(a)(19) (2000).
1396a(a) (30) (A) (2000).

173. The Act also provides, in addition to the language replacing the Boren Amendment, that payment rates cannot be developed or established in secret. The Act specifies
that the State Plan must provide "for procedures to make available to the public the data
and methodology used in establishing payment rates for nursing facilities under this title."
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(29) (2000).
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Act. 74 Thus, the Secretary can approve a State Plan only if he determines that the payment "methods and procedures" in the Plan "assure
that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy ....

quality of

care" and equality of access to health care. 75
The responsibility of the Secretary is not limited to rubber stamping a State Plan that mouths the correct words. Instead, the Act requires that the Secretary make a qualitative judgment about the
effectiveness of State Plan provisions governing care in and payment
for nursing home services. Section 1919(f) will assure achievement of
the specified goals. The Act's requirement that the Plan "assure payments consistently with efficiency economy, quality of care" and equal
access effectively prescribes the nature and depth of the Plan evaluation required of the Secretary. Because Congress dictated that a State
Plan "fulfills the conditions specified in [section 1902(a)]" only if it
"assures" payments consistent with specified goals, the Secretary cannot rest approval of a Plan on opinion, educated guesses, speculation,
probabilities or theories. Instead, the mandate that the payments "assure" consistency with specific objectives makes clear that the Secretary may approve a Plan only if there is a high degree of certainty that
the payments satisfy the statutory criteria. The degree of certainty required to support approval of a Plan cannot be achieved unless the
Secretary conducts a bona fide, substantive and thorough empirical
analysis and rests his determination on the relevant factors and objective data identifying the relationship between payments made pursuant to the State Plan and the statutory objects of economy, efficiency,
quality of care and equal access in the given state.
B.

The Repeal of the Boren Amendment Did Not Confer Unfettered
Discretion on States to Develop and Implement Medicaid
Payment Methodologies

Opponents of the Boren Amendment who believed that the repeal would leave the states with almost unfettered discretion to set
payment rates failed to recognize that the Act contained other provi176
sions governing the calculation, and amount, of Medicaid payment.
Indeed, analysis of the Act and its legislative history demonstrates that
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (62) ("The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills
the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section .... .").
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
176. See American Med. Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1194-95 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
Moreover, some courts have held that Boren Amendment standards continue to govern
Medicaid payment until the state promulgates rules or regulations, or adopts legislation,
replacing the State Plan adopted and implemented under Boren. See Florida Ass'n of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Florida, 1999 WL 304633 at *4 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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repeal of the Boren Amendment actually eliminated state rate setting
discretion in a number of important areas. In fact, the repeal arguably broadened the degree of federal oversight required of State Plan
provisions governing reimbursement of institutional providers.
First, the repeal did not eliminate the basic Medicaid payment
1 77
standard governing payment to all types of providers and suppliers.
Indeed, the NGA itself acknowledged that section 1902(a)(30) prescribed rate setting criteria and, in NGA's view, had caused the states
178
the same problems as the Boren Amendment.
Second, the Boren Amendment limited the extent of the Secretary's review of State Plan provisions regarding institutional payments
because the special rules formerly set forth in Boren, conferring discretion on the states and limiting the Secretary's oversight, no longer
apply. Institutional rate setting should be governed by the same rules
applicable to all other providers. In the past, for example, unless the
state's claims were obviously untrue, the Secretary was required by Boren to accept the state's assurance that its payment Plan complied with
federal law. Now, however, section 1902(a) (30) no longer requires
federal deference to the states' decisions.
Third, the Boren Amendment focused not on the appropriateness of the state's payment methods and procedures, but on the adequacy of aggregate payment rates. Section 1902(a) (30) explicitly
requires that the Secretary approve a State Plan if the state's methods
and procedures assure payment consistent with efficiency, economy,
quality of care and equal access. Thus, the State Plan approval process
should now focus on the payment "methods and procedures" and on
whether they "assure" payment consistent with the statutory objective.
In the past, when the Secretary has been obliged to review the state's
payment "methods and standards," the Secretary has perceived a duty
to 'judge [] and validate [ ] a state's payment methods and standards
from a technical standpoint," 179 to "assess [ ] the appropriateness of
each element of the state's payment system, '
and to approve the
177. See DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (equal access
provision sets minimum payment standard); Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson,
356 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (section 1902(a) (30) applies to payments to all
providers of Medicaid services); Dowling v. Davis, 840 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(section 1902(a) (30) governs the amount and calculation of payment); Mathews, 429 F.
Supp at 1194-95 (section 1902(a)(30), added to Act in 1967, is the basic reimbursement
standard for medical care and services under Medicaid).
178. See supra note 165.
179. See Medicaid Program; Payment for Long-Term Care Facility Services and Inpatient
Hospital Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,046, 56,052 (Dec. 19, 1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 447).
180. See 1981 Medicaid Program, supra note 23, at 47,965.
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Plan only if "these elements and their interaction result[ed] in payments that are consistent [with the statute regulations]."18
HCFA, however, appears to have adopted a laissez-faire approach
consistent with NGA's view. For example, the federal agency has advised the State Medicaid Directors that:
The intent of section 4711 [the Boren Amendment's replacement] is to provide states with maximum possible flexibility,
as well as to minimize HCFA's role in reviewing inpatient
hospital and long-term care state plan amendments involving
payment rate changes. HCFA would consider the state to be
in compliance with [the Boren replacement] provision if it
elected to use a general administrative process similar to the
Federal Administrative Procedures Act that satisfies the requirements for a public process in developing and inviting
the flexibility
comment in section 4711. This will allow states
18 2
to follow current state public procedures.
HCFA's position ignores its prior interpretation of similar language as
well as the mandate of section 1902(a) (30) (A) to approve only State
Plans containing payment methods and procedures "assur[ing] that
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care"
and equal access. HCFA's position also ignores long-standing precedent. Courts interpreting section 1902(a) (30) as well as other provisions of the Act have held that the states cannot determine that State
Plan provisions provide the assurance required by the Act unless objective cost and quality data are known and analyzed."8 3 Rate setting
by chance, or based on an assumption that the Act's criteria have been
18 4
satisfied, is not permitted by the Act.
Viewed in the context of the rest of the Medicaid Act, repeal of
the Boren Amendment ultimately may limit state discretion. For example, Boren authorized the states to define the meaning of key statutory terms (e.g., efficient and economic) and permitted each state "to

181. Id.
182. Letter from Sally K Richardson, Director, Centerfor Medicaid and State Operations,
HCFA to State Medicaid Directors (Dec. 15, 1997) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter
Richardson Letter].
183. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496-98 (9th Cir. 1997) (cannot
know that rates are consistent with economy, efficiency, quality of care without identifying
and considering the cost of services); Arkansas Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 819 F. Supp. 816
(E.D. Ark. 1993), affirmed 6 F.3d 519, 529-31 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Pinnacle Nursing
Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1991); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 983
F.2d 1460, 1464-65 (7th Cir. 1993); Amisub (PSI), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 879
F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989). But see Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d
908, 923-24 (5th Cir. 2000).
184. Cf Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 392-94 (5th Cir. 1980).

202

JOURNAL

OF HEALTH CARE LAW

&

POLICY

[VOL. 4:159

make its own finding that the state plan complied with federal law."' 185
The current statute does not delegate such authority to the states.
This is the case for two reasons.
First, using language remarkably similar to the Boren Amendment, section 1902 (a) (30) (A) requires that the Secretary approve the
State Plan only if the Plan's payment methods and procedures "assure" that payments meet certain standards.1" 6 The Secretary's failure
to conduct an objective and principled analysis of the Plan's compliance with the Act's standards arguably would violate the Plan approval
mandate of section 1902 and also constitute a failure to fulfill the
"duty and responsibility" imposed on the Secretary by other provisions
of the Act.' 8 7 Thus, the Secretary, rather than the state, arguably is
once again charged with the responsibility of validating a Plan's compliance with federal law.
Second, although some may argue that section 1902(a)(30) is
vague, where the Act imposes a duty to review and approve a State
Plan, the courts have held that the Secretary is obliged to define the
key terms used in the Act's applicable payment provisions. 8 ' Should
the Secretary fail to supply definitions, terms such as "efficiency" and
"economy" have been defined by practice and, as Wilder noted, enforced by the courts for many years.' 8 9 Moreover, in important respects, the Act provides its own definitions.' 90 Terms such as "care,"
"services," and "best interest of the recipients" are defined by reference to other provisions of the Act that detail the types and quality of
services that must be provided by nursing homes. For example, 42
U.S.C. § 1396r, requires that, "nursing facilities provide services and
activities that attain or maintain the highest practicable physical,
mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident in accordance
with a written plan of care."' 9 1 Notwithstanding its failure to recognize the payment implications of section 1902(a) (30), HCFA has acknowledged that the repeal of Boren did not undercut the obligations
imposed on the states by the Act to assure quality long term care: "The
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13) (1994).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A) (1994).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(f) (1) (2000), for example, specifies that: It is the duty and responsibility of the Secretary to assure that requirements which govern the provision of care
in nursing facilities under State Plans approved under this title, and the enforcement of
such requirements, are adequate to protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights of residents and to promote effective and efficient use of public monies. Id.
188. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 507 (1990).
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(2) (2000).
191. Id.
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repeal of the Boren amendment has not relieved states of the responsibility of promoting
quality of care for their beneficiaries served in
19 2
nursing homes.'
In sum, overlooked in the rush to repeal Boren, was the fact that
the Amendment had transferred authority to validate a State Plan's
compliance with federal requirements from the Secretary to the states.
Also ignored in the rush to repeal was the fact that Boren also gave
the states broad discretion and flexibility to define key standards that
established the scope of the state's obligation. Focusing only on the
fact that the Boren Amendment had been the basis for state liability,
opponents of the Amendment did not recognize that repeal would
reinstate aspects of the federal-state relationship as it existed before
1980. The Medicaid Act makes clear that the Secretary, exercising the
authority conferred by section 1902 (a) (30), can approve a State Plan
only if he determines that a State Plan's methods and procedures assure payments consistent with economy, efficiency, quality of care and
equal access. Thus, the Act now defines the responsibilities of the Secretary in terms that the states may find hauntingly similar to the obligation imposed by the Act prior to Boren.
Admittedly, the legislative history of the Boren repeal states that
the Committee contemplated that the Act would not support a cause
of action to challenge the adequacy under federal law of a state's
Medicaid payment rates. Unfortunately for the states, the Committee's language is years too late and far to little to prevent enforcement
of section 1902 (a) (30).
C.

The Medicaid Act ContainsEnforceable Payment Standards Even After
the Repeal of the Boren Amendment
1. Section 1902(A)(30) Provided Enforceable Payment Standards
Before the Adoption of the Boren Amendment

When originally adopted, the Medicaid Act contained two provisions governing the amount of payments to providers. The Act contained a generic payment standard, applicable to all providers, 42
U.S.C. section 1396a(a) (30).193 Section 1902a(30), at the time it was
first adopted, mandated that the Secretary should approve State Plans
which:
192. Richardson Letter, supra note 182.
193. DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 546-47 (E.D. Pa. 1980); American Med.
Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1194-95 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F.
Supp. 879, 883-84 (W.D. Tex. 1983); Opelika Nursing Home v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp.
1338, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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Provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available
under the plan as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure
that payments (including payments for any drugs provided
under the plan) are not in excess of reasonable charges consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care. 194
The second payment standard contained in the Medicaid Act required that State Plans provide for payment of the reasonable costs
incurred by hospitals to provide in-patient services to Medicaid
patients.

19 5

Courts generally read the two payment provisions together and
presumed that the provisions specific to hospital reimbursement imposed an obligation on the state in addition to the obligation imposed
by section 1902(a)(30). The state was required to develop a State
Plan including payment methods and standards that complied with
both the reasonable cost payment standard and to assure that such
payments were no more than the reasonable charges paid by Medicare for similar services.1 96 Compliance with both provisions was mandated because, as originally adopted, the inpatient hospital provision
established the statutory minimum and section 1902(a)(30) established a ceiling, limiting Medicaid payments to a provider's Medicare
reasonable charges for similar services. Payments to non-hospital
providers, on the other hand, were subject only to the reasonable
charge limit imposed by section 1902(a) (30).
Initially, almost all providers who sued under section
1902(a) (30) (A) were denied relief. 197 Although providers argued
that section 1902 (a) (30) (A) established minimum payment standards,
most courts viewed the section as authority for the Secretary to impose
upper limits on provider payments.
Despite the differing interpretations of section 1902(a) (30) (A),
there was no question about the enforceability of the section. For example, in the early years after the Medicaid Act was adopted, most
courts held that determination of the amount of payment due for
Medicaid covered nursing home services was committed to the state's
discretion, subject only to the limitation that payments could not ex194. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30) (2000).
195. See Briarcliff Haven, Inc. v. Dep't of Human Res., 403 F. Supp. 1355, 1362-63 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); Lee v. Laitinen, 448 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1968).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30) (2000); DeGregorio, 500 F. Supp. at 549-50.
197. See, e.g., BriardiffHaven, 403 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
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ceed the reasonable charges paid by the Medicare program for the
same services.1 9 8
One court, for example, held that the Act specified no minimum
payment for skilled nursing home services, only a maximum payment
amount, i.e., the Medicare reasonable charges.1 99 The Court further
ruled that, under the Act, reimbursement determinations by the state
might include all or only part of a nursing home's costs of delivering
services. However, the court held that section 1902(a) (30) conferred
no right to a minimum payment but only a right to a payment that did
not exceed reasonable charges.2z°
In the first years after the Act was adopted, many nursing homes
sued under section 1902(a) (30) challenging the Secretary's effort to
equate reasonable charges and reasonable costs. 20 1 The courts unanimously upheld the Secretary's authority to do so. 20 2 Payment on the
basis of Medicare reasonable costs as defined at the time was considered generous, especially in light of the failure at that time of many
states' Medicaid programs to pay the cost of care. Among other
things, payment on a reasonable cost basis would have included payment of a return on equity and an allowance on debt. 20 3 One case
pointed out that the experience of the local nursing homes indicated
that payment on a reasonable cost basis was likely to produce more
revenue than payment on a charge basis.20 4 No court, however, even
suggested that section 1902(a) (30) was not judicially enforceable.
The perception that section 1902(a) (30) was only an upper limit
on payments reflects the fact that the courts, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and State Medicaid agencies appear, in
many instances, to have pursued an ad hoc, rather than a systemic

198. See American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 372 F. Supp. 517
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 909 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974); American Nursing Home
Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 368 F. Supp. 490, 493-94 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 909
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974); Opelika Nursing Home, 448 F.2d at 660-61; BriarcliffHaven,
403 F. Supp at 1362-63; Johnson's Prof'l Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 843
(5th Cir. 1974).
199. See BriarcliffHaven, 403 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
200. See i&; Opelika Nursing Home, 323 F. Supp. at 1210-11.
201. See, e.g., Johnson's Prof1 Nursing Home, 490 F.2d at 843; Opelika Nursing Home, 448

F.2d at 660-61; Opelika Nursing Home, 323 F. Supp. at 1210-11. Cf Carbon Hill Health Care,
Inc. v. Beasley, 528 F. Supp. 421, 423 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (holding that section required states
to promulgate regulations to insure allowable costs incurred in manner consistent with

Medicaid Act).
202. See supra note 201.
203. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 405.429 (2001); Opelika Nursing Home, 448 F.2d at 660-61; Opelika Nursing Home, 323 F. Supp. at 1210-11.
204. See Opelika Nursing Home, 356 F. Supp. at 1343-45.
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approach to rate-setting. 20 5 For example, despite the fact that section
1902(a) (30) originally required that State Plans provide methods and
procedures that assure that payments are not in excess of reasonable
charges consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care, it appears that, in the early years, no effort was made to compel states to
have a basis to believe that the statutory objectives were met prior to
implementing the State Plan provisions. 20 6 As one court pointed out,
prior to the early 1990s, no court had held that a state Medicaid
agency had an obligation to make a finding that its rates satisfied the
statute before the State Plan was put in place.20 7 Even more remarkable, there does not seem to be a single reported decision in which a
plaintiff asked a court to require a state to determine in advance of
implementation that its State Plan satisfied the statute. To the contrary, it seems that the accepted procedure in the early years was that a
state would implement its rate-setting methodology and providers or
recipients would sue for injunctive relief if there was actual harm. Yet,
there was agreement that the Act provided a cause of action to challenge an allegedly illegal payment rate.20 8
Section 1902 (a) (30) also was enforced in actions brought to compel the Secretary to comply with the Act.20 9 Some courts held that the
provision reflected Congress' expectation that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services would establish standards
and definitions governing the interpretation of section
1902(a) (30).21 ° In Opelika NursingHome, Inc. v. Richardson, for example, the Court held that section 1902 (a) (30) was singularly lacking in
specificity and, therefore, administrative interpretation of the statute
was a necessity. 2 11 Similarly, in American Medical Association v. Mathews,
the Northern District of Illinois held that: "[b]ecause Medicaid is a
federal-state cooperative program and state methods and procedures
must be approved by the Secretary to assure conformity with federal
law, it is reasonable to infer that Congress vested responsibility in the
Secretary to give meaning to the language. "212

205. See Lee v. Laitinen, 448 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1968).
206. See American Med. Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1194-95 (N.D. Il1. 1977);
Dowling v. Davis, 840 F. Supp. 731, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id.
See id.
See Opelika Nursing Home, 356 F. Supp. at 1343-45.
See id.
See id.
Mathews, 429 F. Supp. at 1194-95.
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The Secretary exercised the authority conferred by the Act to define some of the terms of section 1902(a) (30).213 Specifically, although the statute limited Medicaid payment rates to Medicare
reasonable charges, the Secretary first recommended, then later required, that Medicaid payments not exceed the Medicare reasonable
cost level.2 14 Moreover, despite the fact that section 1902(a) (30) unlike the provisions governing inpatient hospital reimbursement did not incorporate the reasonable cost payment standard, the Secretary adopted informal guidelines suggesting that the reasonable cost
reimbursement standards ought to be applied to payments to nonhospital providers. For example, HHS' Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Supplement D, Medical Assistance Programs,
set forth the Department's interpretation. 2 15 The Manual provided:
For institutions, other than hospitals, the fee structure will
focus on payment on a reasonable cost basis determined according to commonly used accounting methods on a per
diem or relationship of cost to charges basis. For comparable facilities, payment equivalent to reasonable costs under
Part A of Title XVIII is recommended.2 16
Many courts acknowledged that a major purpose of section
1902 (a) (30) and its implementing regulations was to make services
available to the Medicaid beneficiaries.2 17 Yet, the early decisions generally ignored the possibility that the statute imposed an independent
obligation (i.e., with respect to minimum payment levels) beyond the
reasonable charge limitation. 2 18 Instead, courts asserted that the
"consistent with" clause was a further limitation on reasonable charges
and, in fact, provided the basis for the Secretary's authority to limit
219
reasonable charges to reasonable costs.
A few early decisions interpreting section 1902(a) (30) did suggest, however, that there were some minimum Medicaid payment

213. See American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 909, 911-12
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
214. See id. (emphasis added).
215. See id.
216. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENTF D, § D-5340. See also
Lee v. Laitinen, 448 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1968).

217. SeeJohnson's Prof'l Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 844-45 (5th Cir.
1974); Opelika Nursing Home v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 1338, 1393-95 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
218. See Briarcliff Haven v. Dep't Human Res. of Georgia, 403 F. Supp. 1355, 1362-63
(N.D. Ga. 1975); American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 372 F. Supp.
517, 521-22 (D.D.C. 1974); American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 368 F.
Supp. 490, 493-94 (D.D.C. 1973).
219. See Johnson's ProJfl Nursing Home, 490 F.2d at 844-45; Opelika Nursing Home, 448 F.2d
at 660-61; Opelika Nursing Home, 323 F. Supp. at 1210.
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standards.2 2 ° These courts appeared to focus, not on the statutory language of section 1902(a) (30), but on the implementing regulations
and Manual provisions. 221 The Manual, and later the regulations, required that payments be sufficient to assure Medicaid beneficiaries access to medical services to the same extent as the general
population.2 2 2
One of the earliest cases applying the Medicaid Act's payment
provisions held that the equal access requirement dictated that both
the quantity and the quality of services available to Medicaid beneficiaries must be the same as the quantity and quality of services available to the general population. In one case, the Montana Supreme
Court held:
[I] t is apparent that the clear legal duty imposed upon the
Welfare Board is not in terms of a specific rate of payment,
but in the form of an objective to be attained; namely, to
make nursing home care available to recipients to at least the
same extent as to the general population. Petitioners arrive
at the same concept of the duty imposed, but on the basis of
federal law requirements as to standards of service. Whether
phrased in terms of quality or quantity, the duty imposed is
the same, to make available to Title
XIX recipients at least
223
that which is available to others.
The Montana court's decision defining access in terms of the quality
2 24
of services as well as the quantity, however, stands alone.
Two other decisions found that section 1902 (a) (30)'s implementing regulations required a minimum payment level sufficient to provide a defined quantity of service. 22 5 Remarkably, these two decisions
hold that:
A state which elects to participate in the Medicaid program is
required to provide eligible recipients with assistance in five
general categories of medical treatment. [citations omitted].
Unless rates are set for each of the required services at a level
220. See, e.g., Lee v. Laitinen, 448 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1968).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. These courts, however, held that limitations on access due to insufficient funding
were permissible because providing fewer services for an entire year was better than full
access for part of a year and no access for the remainder. See Lee, 448 P.2d at 156. The
court never addressed the alternative that the state fully find its obligations under the
federal statute. See id.
225. See Dowling v. Davis, 840 F. Supp. 731, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1992); DeGregorio v.
O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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which will offer a sufficient number of providers the opportunity to receive payments which will exceed their marginal
costs for servicing Medicaid recipients (and to be induced
thereby to enlist in the program), it would be possible for
states to evade the Federal requirement of providing all five
categories of services, by setting unreasonably low rates for
certain disfavored services ....
But the "equal access" regulation tests directly the adequacy of a rate in furthering the
goals of the Medicaid Act, by evaluating the rate's performance in making medical services available to eligible
individuals.2 2 6
In sum, section 1902(a) (30) was routinely enforced by the courts
beginning in the first few years after the Medicaid Act was adopted.
Although courts generally did not view the section as a minimum payment standard, courts routinely held that the section defined the Secretary's power and duties with respect to sate plan provisions
governing Medicaid provider payment.
2.

The Evolution of a Minimum Payment Standard and the
Metamorphosis of Section 1902(a)(30)(A) from a Ceiling
into a Floor

A little more than five years after the Medicaid Act was adopted,
there was widespread agreement that the consequence of conferring
near limitless rate setting discretion on the states was that, as a whole,
the nursing home component of the Medicaid health care delivery
system was a chaotic mess. Various commentators pointed out that
the payment methods adopted'by the states varied greatly.22 7 Some
states used cost-finding and payment methodologies designed to pay
the full cost of services.2 28 Other states paid a negotiated rate which
22 9
Still
may or may not have approximated the cost of delivering care.

other states used a flat rate or another payment methodology that was
unrelated to the actual cost of care.2 3 ° Such payment systems provided no incentives for efficient delivery of care. 2 3 '

226. DeGregorio, 500 F. Supp. at 549-50.
227. See, e.g., Johnson's Profll Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 844-45 (5th
Cir. 1974).
228. See Johnson's Profl Nursing Home, 490 F.2d at 844-45; Murphy Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Rate Setting Comm'n, 364 Mass. 454, 462-63, 468-69 (1973).
229. See Johnson's Profl Nursing Home, 490 F.2d at 844-45.
230. See Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 602
F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1979).
231. See id.
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There was a widely held perception among lawmakers that most
states set payment rates arbitrarily.2 3 2 Further, there also was a broad
consensus that payments rates generally were too low to support quality care. 2 " Following an investigation prompted by a spate of care
scandals, Congress determined that some providers were paid too little while others were paid too much. 234 Further, Congress concluded
that, as a general rule, state Medicaid payment methodologies failed
to bring about quality care, and failed to promote the efficient and
economic provision of services. 2 3 In the early and mid-1970's, Congress reacted by making several changes in the way that Medicaid paid
for nursing home care. In the process, section 1902(a) (30) was transformed from a payment rate ceiling into a minimum payment
standard.
First, on October 30, 1972, Congress amended the Medicaid Act
to add specific criteria governing payment to nursing homes.2 3 6 Effective July 1, 1976, the statute required: "[p]ayment of the skilled nursing facility, and intermediate care facility services provided under the
plan on a reasonable cost-related basis as determined in accordance
with methods and standards which shall be developed by the state on
the basis of7 cost-finding methods approved and verified by the
Secretary.

23

Although the "reasonable cost related" standard contained in section 249 contemplated that the States would continue to exercise discretion and flexibility in designing Medicaid payment systems to fit
local needs,2 3 8 the new statute, in contrast to its predecessor, precluded arbitrary rate setting by requiring that the cost-finding methods be related to the cost of care and be "approved and verified by the
Secretary." Thus, Congress now imposed on HHS the obligation to
analyze and verify whether the state's payment methods and standards
satisfied the Medicaid Act. 2 39 The Fifth Circuit held that section 249

required the Secretary to:
232. See American Nursing Home Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 372 F. Supp. 517, 52122 (D.D.C. 1974).
233. See id. (quoting Sen. Harrison Williams).
234. See Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F. Supp. 879, 883-84 (W.D. Tex. 1983); American Nursing Home Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. at 521-22.
235. See Minnesota Ass'n of Health CareFacilities, 602 F.2d at 153-54.
236. See American Nursing Home Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. at 521-22; American Nursing Home
Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council, 497 F.2d 909, 911-12; Opelika Nursing Home v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 1338, 1393-95 (M.D. Ala. 1973). Thomas, 557 F. Supp. at 883-84.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (2000).
238. See Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1980).
239. See id. at 392-93.
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(1) establish standards and criteria by which the State and
Federal officials could determine the meaning of crucial statutory terms; and
(2) actually verify, through documentation obtained from
the state or by independent study conducted by the Secretary, that payments
under the State Plan actually met the stat240
utory standard.
Further, the Court held that HHS could not approve a State Plan by
relying upon an unverified institutional assumption that payment at
the sixtieth percentile incurred by the class satisfied the statute.2 41
Second, Congress directed HHS to eliminate the common practice of permitting the resident (and his or her relatives or friends) to
supplement the Medicaid rate by making additional payments to the
provider. Medicaid programs in several states were based on the expectation that inadequate Medicaid payments would be supplemented with additional private payments. Because Medicaid
payments now were required to be "reasonably cost related," rate supplementation was considered unnecessary.
Consequently, the Secretary by regulation provided that supplementation would be phased out beginningJuly 1, 1971.242 According
to the regulation, the State could permit supplementation for a limited time after July 1, 1971, only if it certified that Medicaid payments
were less than the reasonable cost of nursing home care. 243 As a result, the Medicaid payment became the exclusive source of provider
payment for Medicaid services provided by nursing homes.
Third, at about the same time that Congress adopted section 249
and eliminated supplementation, HHS codified the equal access requirement in the Code of Federal Regulations.2 4 4 In 1978, the Medicaid Act was amended to include the essential text of the
regulation. 24" The purpose and effect of codification of the equal access provision in the Code of Federal Regulations, and later in section
1902 (a) (30),246 was to draw attention to the requirement and to estab240. Id. at 394.
241. See id.
242. SeeJohnson's Prof'l Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841, 844-45 (5th Cir.
1974); Opelika Nursing Home, 448 F.2d at 660-61.
243. See Johnson'sProfl Nursing Home, 490 F.2d at 844-45.
244. See DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The substance
of the new regulation originally had appeared in 1966 in HHS's Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Supplement D, § D-5320.1.
245. See 43 Fed. Reg. 45176.
246. The equal access provision was added to the statute effective December 19, 1989,
by Pub. L. No. 101-239 § 6402(a).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 4:159

lish an objective, enforceable, minimum Medicaid payment
standard.2 4 7
Finally, in 1981 Congress eliminated the reasonable charge limitation from section 1902(a)(30). As amended the statute required
that the State Medicaid Plan: "provide such methods and procedures
relating to ... the payment for care and services available under the
plan . . . as may be necessary to assure that payments are consistent

with efficiency, economy, and quality of care. 2 48
According to the legislative history, the intent of the amendment
was straight forward - the repeal "remove[d] Medicare reasonable
charge levels as a ceiling on Medicaid payments. '24 9 The change,
which was almost unnoticed for many years, would have a substantial
impact on Medicaid reimbursement.

25 0

When the reasonable charge limitation was deleted, the significance of the phrase "consistent with economy, efficiency and quality
of care" changed dramatically. Efficiency, economy and quality of
care no longer modified the reasonable charge limitation. Instead,
the "consistent with" requirement now mandated that the State Plan's
payment methods and procedures must be consistent with economy,
efficiency and quality of care.
Moreover, any doubt that section 1902(a) (30) established an enforceable minimum payment standard was eliminated when the section was further amended in 1989. Although the Secretary's
regulations implementing section 1902 (a) (30) (A) long had contained
a requirement that Medicaid beneficiaries have access to services
equal to that of the general population, Congress believed that the
equal access requirement was given insufficient attention. 21 1 Consequently, Congress amended section 1902 (a) (30) to incorporate the
247. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 834 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Ark. 1992);
Lee v. Laitinen, 448 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1968); Dowling v. Davis, 840 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.
Cal. 1992); DeGregorio, 500 F. Supp. at 549; Clark v. Kaizer, 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Cal.
1990) (dental); King v. Sullivan, 776 F. Supp. 645 (D. R.I. 1991) (general).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A) (2000).
249. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Report of the Committee on the Budget,
H.R. REP. No. 97-158, at 312 (1981).
250. The significance of the change was obscured by the fact that in 1981 the Boren
Amendment's rate setting standards had been extended to state plan provisions governing
payment for inpatient hospital services. See id. State plan provisions regarding payments to
nursing homes had been subjected to Boren in 1980, the prior year. As a result, the Secretary reviewed and approved state plan provisions governing institutional payment pursuant
to a special set of rules distinct from the generally applicable plan approval process. Thus,
although section 1902(a) (30) (A) was not limited by its terms to noninstitutional providers,
the impact of the repeal of the reasonable charge limitation was viewed primarily in terms
of its impact on payments to physicians. Id. at 312-13.
251. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 526.

2001]

FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QuALrTY NURSING CARE

213

requirement directly in the statute. The amendment expanded the
existing minimum requirement that payments be consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care to also require that payments be
"sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are
available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population. "25 2 As a number of
courts have held, the equal access requirement was added to section
1902 (a) (30) to expand the state's minimum payment obligation and
253
to encourage enforcement.
The legislative changes, especially the adoption of section 249's
reasonable cost related payment requirement and the amendment of
section 1902(a) (30) marked a sea change. After years of state discretion and scandals, Congress had had enough. The statutory and regulatory amendments established definitive payment limits, denying
states unlimited discretion to establish Medicaid payments methodologies. 25 4' The changes were designed to assure that there was a verifiable and reasonable relationship between payments to nursing homes
and the objectives of the Medicaid Act before the State received federal matching funds. Thus, in one of the first actions enforcing the
equal access requirement, as set forth in the regulations, HHS in an
amicus brief took the position -

and the court agreed -

that the

equal access provision and the reasonable cost related payment standard were complementary minimum requirements for Medicaid
payments.

3.

2 55

Courts Have Enforced Section 1902(a)(30) On Behalf of Various
Providers and Suppliers

The Act's guarantee of payment consistent with economy, efficiency, quality of care and equal access set forth in section
1902 (a) (30) plainly can be enforced in an action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1902(a) (30) has been enforced in numerous
federal and state court cases. 256 Indeed, one court recently has re252. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30(A) (2000).
253. See id. See also Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp.
1309, 1331-32 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 866 F.
Supp. 1444, 1451-52 (D. Mass. 1994). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 389-90 (1989). The
1989 amendment was prompted by concern that Medicaid beneficiaries had inadequate
access to obstetrical services. However, section 1902(a) (30) (A) - and the equal access
provision - always had applied and continued to apply to all covered services. See, e.g.,
Bullen, 866 F. Supp. at 1454.
254. See Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1980).
255. See DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
256. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 866 F. Supp. 1444, 1452
(D. Mass. 1994).
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jected summarily an argument that section 1902(a) (30) was not enforceable, noting that the courts nearly unanimously hold that the
provision is enforceable. 2 17 In fact, section 1902 (a) (30) routinely is
enforced not just by the courts, but by HHS' Departmental Appeals
Board as well.2 58
Section 1902(a) (30) provided a basis for Medicaid reimbursement litigation for twenty years before Wilder was decided, i.e., almost
from the inception of the Medicaid Program. More recently, courts
have found that section 1902(a) (30) is similar to the Boren Amendment in function and that key terms in section 1902(a) (30) and the
Boren Amendment substantially overlap. 25 9 As a result, when the
courts have applied the traditional principles discussed in Wilder and
its progeny, it has been held that section 1902 (a) (30) can be enforced
through an action brought pursuant to section 1983.260 Yet, enforceability of section 1902(a) (30) ultimately is not dependent on the viability of the Wilder decision. When traditional principles governing
determination of the enforceability of federal statutes pursuant to section 1983 are applied to section 1902 (a) (30) (A), the section plainly
qualifies for private enforcement.
For example, the courts have held that, because section
1902(a) (30) governs provider payment rates, providers plainly are
among the intended beneficiaries of the provision.2 61 In addition,
courts have emphasized that section 1902(a) (30) is written in terms of
legislative command and does not merely state a Congressional preference. 26 2 Specifically, section 1902(a) (30) provides that a State Plan
"must" include payment methodologies and procedures that are con257. See id.
258. See In re Colorado State Plan Amendment No. 88-11, Health Care Financing Administration Remand Order (ADMR June 23, 1995); In re Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., No.
90-155-1272 (DAB Aug. 19,1991).
259. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 524-25 (8th Cir. 1993); Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 816 F. Supp. 819, 822-23 (E.D. Ark 1993).
260. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 1448.
261. See Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 1309,
1330-32 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 866 F. Supp at 1451-52; Arkansas Med. Soc'y,
6 F.3d at 526; Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1348-49 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Cf
Children's Memorial Hosp. v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 562 F. Supp. 165, 167 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(hospital has standing to enforce section 1902(a) (30)). But see Evergreen Presbyterian
Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927-29 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that section
1902(a)(30) can be enforced by Medicaid beneficiaries, but not by providers); Pennsylvania Pharmacists Assoc. v. Houston, No. 00-1898, 2002 WL 389273 (3d Cir. Mar. 13,
2002) (reversing Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houston, 171 F.3d 842, 850 n.7 (3d Cir.
1999) and holding that beneficiaries may enforce section 1902(a) (30(A), but providers
may not).
262. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 821-22 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
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sistent with efficiency, economy, quality of care and equal access. 2 63
Further, the courts have held that, although the statute reserves discretion and flexibility to the states to craft their own payment Plans,
the terms of the statute are well understood and sufficiently definite
for judicial enforcement. 26 4 Several courts have held, for example,
that the Boren Amendment was more nebulous than section
1902(a) (30).265 These courts pointed out that, unlike the Boren
Amendment, section 1902(a) (30) actually provides a measuring rod
that gives objective meaning to its terms, 2 6 6 and that the terms of section 1902(a) (30) are defined by other provisions of the Medicaid Act,
by regulations, and by common usage. 267 Finally, the courts have held
that the context and background of section 1902(a) (30) did not evidence any Congressional intent dispelling the strong presumption
that the statute was enforceable.2 68
Examination of the legislative history vanquishes any doubt about
the enforceability of section 1902(a) (3). In fact, the courts have held
that the legislative history of section 1902 (a) (30) affirmatively demonstrates that Congress intended that the provision be enforceable privately through an action brought based on section 1983.269 Unlike

the Boren Amendment, section 1902(a) (30) was modified and expanded in 1989 against a backdrop of routine and notorious provider
enforcement, through section 1983, of the Medicaid Act payment provisions. 2 70 Thus, one court has stated:
263. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., No. 90-119, (DAB Aug. 22, 1991); Arkansas Med.
Soc'y, Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 821-22. See also Minnesota Home Care Ass'n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d
917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997) ("The Medicaid Act mandates consideration of the equal access
factors of efficiency, economy, quality of care and access to services in the process of setting
or changing payment rates . . .").
264. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 527.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 527-28.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 866 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (D.
Mass. 1994).
270. Of course, repeal of the Boren Amendment included language that stated that the
committee intended that no other provision of the Medicaid Act should serve as a basis for
institutional reimbursement litigation. Although such a statement of the Committee's intent might be persuasive in some other context, such commentary should be too little and
too late to preclude enforcement of § 1902(a) (30). The Supreme Court repeatedly has
rejected similar attempts to smuggle subsequent commentary into an existing statute. See
Pennsylvania Med. Soc'y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994). "'[E]ven when a subsequent House Committee has commented upon an earlier statute, the interpretation carries
little weight with the courts.'" Id. at 898-99 (citing New York City Health of Hosps. Corp. v.
Perales, 954 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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When the Equal Access language of § 30(a) was adopted in
1989 Congress was not acting on a tabula rasa. There was a
history of § 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid statute by
providers and beneficiaries of which Congress was presumed
to be aware. Given this tradition, congressional intent and
language must be especially clear to support the conclusion
that the Congress intended to treat the provisions applicable
to these providers differently than it had other beneficiaries
under the Act. 7 '
Moreover, Congress added the equal access provision to section
1902(a) (30) precisely because the requirement, when it was embodied only in the regulation, was perceived as receiving inadequate
27 2
enforcement.
For many years, the Medicaid Act contained two distinct procedures governing approval of State Plan provisions: (1) a special set of
rules applicable only to State Plan provisions governing payments to
institutional providers; and (2) a separate set of rules governing Secretarial approval of State Plan provisions governing payments to noninstitutional providers. 273 The Boren Amendment, for example, set
forth specific standards governing the amount of payment due institutional providers, supplied unique procedures governing development
of such payment plans and established standards governing Secretarial review and approval of State Plan provisions regarding institutional reimbursement. 2 4 Section 1902(a) (30), in contrast, was viewed
as the statutory standard governing Medicaid payment for outpatient
services, physician services and other noninstitutional services. It is,
however, clear that section 1902 (a) (30) governs payment to institutional providers and that it can be enforced in an action brought by
such providers. Indeed, section 1902(a) (30) establishes the general
standards that govern payments for all types of covered services under
the Medicaid Act.
The contention that section 1902(a) (30) is limited to noninstitutional providers is contradicted by the history of the section and by
the case law interpreting section 1902(a) (30). For almost thirty years
courts have characterized section 1902(a) (30) as the basic payment

271. Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc., 866 F. Supp. at 1451; see also Arkansas Med.
Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 526; Methodist Hosps., 860 F. Supp. at 1331-32.
272. See, e.g., Arkansas Med. Socy, 6 F.3d at 526; H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 2,115-16
(1989).
273. See Arkansas Med. Socy, 6 F.3d at 522 n.2.
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (13) (A) (1981).
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standard governing all Medicaid payment for services.275 Section
1902 (a) (30) has been enforced at the behest of institutional providers 276 and recipients 2 77 as well as noninstitutional providers. In fact,
the general provisions of HCFA's regulations governing State Plan
payment provisions (i.e. the regulations establishing standards governing all Medicaid payments) state that the regulations are based in
part on Section 1902(a) (30).
Second, section 1902 (a) (30) is broadly phrased and there is no
limitation to State Plan provisions that establish methods and procedures for payment of noninstitutional providers. There is no obvious
basis for reading such an unexpressed legislative intent. In fact, finding an implicit Congressional intent to deny institutional providers
payment rights that the statute confers upon noninstitutional providers not only does violence to the plain language of the statute, it also
makes no sense. Institutional providers and their patients have no
lesser need for payment methods and standards consistent with the
efficiency, economy, quality of care and equal access than do noninstitutional providers and their patients. Assuring noninstitutional providers a defined level of payments creates arbitrary distinctions
unrelated to the goals of the Medicaid Act, including the goals made
explicit by section 1902(a) (30).278
Finally, after repeal of the Boren Amendment, section
1902 (a) (30) provides the only explicit standards governing State Plan
provisions regarding payments for Medicaid covered services. Notwithstanding the rhetorical excess of the repeal's sponsors, it would
defy common sense - as well as the language of the statute - to
believe that Congress intended to authorize states to spend billions of
dollars in federal matching funds for hospitals and nursing home
care, but did not provide any standards governing the amount of such
expenditures. The statute expressly provides that in order to qualify
for federal funding, a State Plan "must assure" that payments are consistent with defined goals. Further, as HHS instructed the Medicaid

275. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 866 F. Supp. at 1454; DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp.
541, 546-47 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
276. See Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Bd. of Soc. Welfare, 490 F.2d 1324, 132829 (10th Cir. 1974); Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 602 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1979); Arkansas Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 834 F. Supp.
1097, 1100-01 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
277. SeeArkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 819 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1993); Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993); Seneca Nursing Home, 490 F.2d
at 1328-29; Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 834 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
278. Cf Hillhaven Corp. v. Revitz, 733 F. Supp. 1224, 1225 (D. Wisc. 1984); Methodist
Hosps., Inc. v. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 1309, 1330-32 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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Directors, the repeal of the Boren Amendment did not relieve the
states of their obligation to assure quality care as defined in the Act.27 9
The proposition that the states have unfettered discretion not
only to spend billions of federal dollars but also to establish the standards governing the expenditure of federal money allegedly delegated by Congress raises Constitutional considerations. 210 Congress
may delegate broad discretion to the states to design their Medicaid
programs.2 8 1 Congress should not be allowed, however, to delegate to
the states unlimited authority to determine how federal money will be
spent.
Courts enforcing section 1902(a) (30) almost uniformly read the
statute to "establish[ ] an unambiguous statutory obligation for states
participating in the Medicaid program to establish a procedurally
sound rate setting methodology which considers the relevant factors
of efficiency, economy, quality of care and equal access." 28 2 Courts
generally find that section 1902(a) (30) imposes a procedural obligation on the states with respect to the manner in which the payment
provisions of State Plans are developed despite the fact that the provision contains no requirement similar to the "findings" requirement
imposed by the Boren Amendment. 2 3 The obligation to develop a
payment methodology based on a procedurally sound, principled
analysis is, however, consistent with section 1902 (a) (30)'s command
that the Plan's methods and procedures must "assure" payments consistent with efficiency, economy, quality and equal access.

279. See Richardson Letter, supra note 182.
280. The Non-Delegation Clause of the Constitution requires that Congress not delegate its lawmaking function. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 1; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
758 (1996). While the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the Congress "simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives," it
also has made clear that Congress may not, absent a demonstrable basis, delegate unfettered discretion to executive agencies. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
Under the "intelligible principle" test, Congress must clearly delineate "the general policy,
the public agency which is to apply [the general policy], and the boundaries of this delegated authority" in order to transfer constitutionally. Id. at 372-73. Here, one could reasonably argue that the Secretary's non-uniform and seemingly unbounded delegation of
the discretion to spend billions of federal dollars as well as to establish the standards governing those expenditures fails to satisfy the "intelligible principle" test and, therefore,
violates the delegation doctrine.
281. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443 (1977).
282. Arkansas Med. Socy, 819 F. Supp. at 821-22.

283. See Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (7th. Cir. 1996); Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Edgar, 765 F. Supp. 1343, 1348-49 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that section
1902(a) (30) complements the Boren Amendment).
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In Arkansas Medical Society, for example, the court held that the
payment provisions of the State Medicaid Plan had to be justified by
data and analysis prior to implementation. The court said:
The state must consider, on the basis of some reasonably
principled analysis, the substantive requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (30) (A) in setting its payment rates. The
state's payment rates are not proper if the methods and procedures it utilizes in formulating its rates, rather than being
bona fide and objective, are merely an exercise to make the
best case to support the state's rates, and the state considers
only factors favorable to its position while failing to consider
the relevant factors.2 8 4
The Ninth Circuit recently has come to a similar conclusion.28 5
In Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe the Court of Appeals held that, in setting Medicaid payment rates, the "[state] must rely on responsible
cost studies, its own or others," that provide reliable data as a basis for
its rate setting.28 6 Similarly, in Visiting Nurse Association v. Bullen,2 s 7
the court held:
The issue is not whether the rate set by the defendants will in
fact have a particular result, failure of equal access, forcing
these providers out of the market place with replacements.
Rather the issue is whether the rates set by the defendants
conform to particular criteria - whether they took the
equal access issue and other statutory standards in
consideration.2 88
HHS has taken a similar position. In In re Colorado State Plan
Amendment No. 88-11, the Departmental Appeals Board upheld the
Secretary's refusal to approve a plan amendment. 289 The Board, applying section 1902(a) (30), held that the state's payment methods
and standards had to be justified by data demonstrating linkage to the

284. Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 819 F. Supp. at 823 (citations omitted).
285. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997).
286. See id. The Ninth Circuit ruling is consistent with HCFA's position that the regulations contemplate that payment provisions adopted pursuant to § 1902(a)(30) will be
predicated on objective contemporaneous data. See also Illinois Hosp. Ass'n, 765 F. Supp. at
1349 (hospitals have section 1983 cause of action to challenge, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a) (30) (A), state's failure to develop payment methods and procedures for outpatient procedures based on empirical studies).
287. 866 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Mass. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir.
1996).
288. Id.
289. See In re Colorado State Plan Amendment No. 88-11, Health Care Financing Administration Remand Order (ADMRJune 23, 1995).
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Moreover, the Board held that the regulations

implementing section 1902 (a) (30) contemplated that the state would
determine proper payment rates in a reasonable manner and that its
determination would be documented contemporaneously, not years
later.29 1
Whatever means are used to develop the data, at a bare minimum, section 1902(a)(30) commands that the state consider efficiency, economy, quality of care and equality of access.29 2 Recently,
for example, one court held that the obligation imposed by section
1902 (a) (30) could not be satisfied unless the state first determined
what it costs an efficient [provider] economically to provide quality
care. 29 3 In Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe, the Ninth Circuit also held
that the State Plan violated section 1902(a) (30) and ordered that:
Upon remand the department should undertake responsible
cost studies that will provide reliable data as to the hospitals'
costs in providing outpatient services to the end that it determines the cost to an efficient hospital economically providing quality care. The state must then set rates that have some
reasonable relations to such costs .... 294
According to the court, unless such an analysis is done and a baseline
is established, neither the state nor the Secretary would have a basis to
know whether the methods and standards assured payment consistent
with efficiency, economy, quality or equality of access. 29 5 The Ninth
Circuit specifically noted that while payments must bear some "reasonable relationship" to costs, payment of less than reasonable costs
might be permissible in some circumstances.2 9 6 However, the state
had the burden of justifying a "rate that substantially deviates from
29 7
such determined cost."
In developing payment provisions under section 1902 (a) (30) for
State Medicaid Plans and considering economy, efficiency, quality of
care and equal access, as mandated by the statute, the states are not
bound to utilize a specific or rigid formula. 2 8 To the contrary, the
courts emphasize that section 1902(a) (30) confers considerable dis-

290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 819 F. Supp. 816, 816 (E.D. Ark. 1993);
Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 519 (8th Cir. 1993).
293. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1498-99 (9th Cir. 1997).
294. Id. at 1500.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 1498-99.
297. Id. at 1500.
298. See id. at 1498-99.
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cretion and flexibility on the states to design payment systems using
procedures that suit their own circumstances.2 9 9 In fact, courts have
even held that section 1902(a) (30) leaves the states free to consider
factors in addition to those enumerated in the statute. For example,
courts have held that states are free to consider health planning goals.
Thus, courts have stated that states are free to build incentives into
their State Plans to encourage or discourage certain types of behavior
or provider operations.3 ° °
On the other hand, rate setting solely based on budgetary considerations violates section 1902 (a) (30) .3 1 As one court held, "[b]y tying payment rates solely to state budgetary needs, [the state] has
totally ignored the federal mandate that rates must be adequate to
assure Medicaid beneficiaries reasonable access to hospital services of
adequate quality." 3°2 Similarly, rates may not be set based solely on
comparison of rates paid by other states.S°u Moreover, as was the case
under the Boren Amendment, "in reviewing the state's Medicaid plan,
if a court concludes that the state has failed in its obligation to consider the requirements of the Medicaid Act, the court may 3invalidate
°4
the state action without reviewing substantive compliance.
Other courts have disagreed, holding that section 1902(a)(30)
does not require that State Plan provisions be justified theoretically in
advance of implementation. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has
distinguished section 1902(a) (30) from the Boren Amendment. According to the Court, unlike the Boren Amendment, section
1902(a) (30) requires a state "to produce a result, not to employ any

299. See Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir.
1995). Some courts have stated that § 1902(a) (30) confers even more discretion and flexibility than the Boren Amendment. Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1498-99; Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527-28 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, although most courts appear to contemplate that states will develop rate setting systems based upon an investigation and study
of pertinent data, one court has held that information about the statutorily mandated factors can be obtained informally. Minnesota Homecare Ass'n, Inc. v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917,
918 (8th Cir. 1997).
300. See Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1498-99; Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. O'Houstoun, 1999
WL 164349 at *8 (3d Cir. 1999).
301. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 530-31; Kansas Hosp. Ass'n v. Whiteman, 835 F.
Supp. 1556, 1571 (D. Kan. 1993); Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 816 F. Supp. 819,
823 (E.D. Ark 1993); Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 576 F. Supp. 360, 371-72
(N.D. Ill. 1983). But see Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 92223 (5th Cir. 2000).
302. Illinois Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Public Aid, 576 F. Supp. 360, 368 n.9 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
303. See Arkansas Med. Soc', 6 F.3d at 530-31.
304. Arkansas Med. Socy, 819 F. Supp. at 824-25. See also Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir.
1997).
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particular methodology for getting there."' 0 5 Although this position
has been rejected implicitly by the Eighth Circuit.. 6 and the Ninth
Circuit 7 and by other courts, a number of early decisions interpreting section 1902 (a) (30) rest on similar reasoning.
The position of the Seventh Circuit and the earlier decisions contravene the intent of the Medicaid Act. In essence, the Seventh Circuit ruling permits a state to utilize a "hit or miss" approach in which a
substantive result that is contrary to the statute is permissible so long
as the state reacts and modifies the Plan. As a general proposition, it
is inconceivable that Congress intended to permit the states to wager
the health, safety and welfare of Medicaid beneficiaries on a game of
chance.
Indeed, section 1902(a) (30) (A) expressly precludes "hit or miss"
rate setting.30 8 The statute, like the Boren Amendment, requires that
the State Plans' methods and standards "assure" payments consistent
with the Act's goals of efficiency, economy, quality of care and equal
access to quality care. 30 9 Unlike Boren, the Secretary, not the state,
must verify the assurance prior to approving a State Plan for federal
funding. 310 It would make little sense to cast the requirements for
State Plan approval in terms of a guarantee and then permit the state
to relegate achievement of the Act's goals to chance.3 1 1
The only way the State can assure that the Plan complies with
section 1902 (a) (30) is to develop the Plan based on objective data and
analysis. Without such data and analysis, the Secretary has no basis to
determine whether the Plan assures compliance with the statute and,

305. Methodist Hosp., 91 F.3d at 1029-30. See also Evergreen PresbyterianMinistries, Inc., 235
F.3d at 933 n.33 (5th Cir. 2000) (state failed to conduct any studies of the impact of the
rate reduction on providers; court does not decide necessity of studies but notes "that
studies while helpful, are not required by the language of section 1902(a) (30) (A)."); Rite
Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. O'Houstoun, 1999 WL 164349 at *6-7 (3d Cir. 1999) (arguing
that section 1902(a) (30) requires a result not a process; but also holding that state cannot
act arbitrarily and upholding payment methodology based on eleven month investigation).
Cf NewJersey Hosp. Ass'n v. Waldman, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37153 at *5 (3d Cir. 1995)
(section 1902(a) (30) is substantive requirement; court reviews procedure and impact of
rate change jointly).
306. See Minnesota Homecare Ass'n, Inc. v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997).
307. See Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997).
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (A) (1994).
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See Lapeer County Med. Care Facility, No. 1:91-CV-333, 1992 WL 220917, at *9
(objective findings necessary to support state's assurance of compliance with Medicaid Act
must be completed prior to implementation to assure that achievement of Act's goals is
not impeded).
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therefore, no basis to approve the Plan.31 2 Further, the majority of
courts - and HHS - reject the Seventh Circuit's position. The prevailing rule is that the data and analysis required to justify payment
methods and standards under section 1902 (a) (30) must be developed
31 3
contemporaneously with the adoption of the payment provisions.
For example, HHS' Departmental Appeals Board, in an action to
enforce section 1902(a) (30), held that the state was required to have
contemporaneous documentation to support the State Plan payment
provisions.314 The Board held, "[the documentation to be provided
to HCFA upon request is supposed to be documentation about data,
315
calculations, and computations used in making a state's findings.
Similarly, in Arkansas Medical Society the Eighth Circuit held that "in
determining whether DHS has complied with the equal access provision, the court considers DHS's actions prior to the rate reductions."3 1 6 In other instances, courts likewise have held that the
burden is on the state to develop and maintain contemporaneous documentation demonstrating that it developed its rate setting methodology based upon the statutorily mandated factors.31 7
As was the case with the Boren Amendment, section 1902(a) (30)
claims appear, for the most part, to be resolved based upon whether
the state developed the payment Plan properly. However, even if a
Plan is developed in a procedurally proper manner, the payment provisions still must actually achieve the substantive statutory goals of assuring consistency with efficiency, economy, quality of care and
equality of access. 31 8 In Visiting Nurse Association v. Bullen, for example, the First Circuit held that even though a Plan had been properly

312. Cf Erie County Geriatric Ctr. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1991); Belshe, 103
F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997).
313. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, DAB No. 1557 (1996).
314. See id.
315. Id. See also North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, DAB No. 1025 (1989) ("After-the-fact assumptions, based on a study which came about only after the federal agency
has discerned a problem, are wholly inadequate."); and Arkansas Dep't of Human Resources, DAB No. 1273 (1991) (stating HCFA's position that regulations contemplated an
effort by the state to determine this amount in some reasonable manner which could be
documented).
316. Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527-28 (8th Cir. 1993).
317. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, DAB No. 1557 (1996).
318. See Minnesota Homecare Ass'n, Inc. v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997);
Arkansas Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 819 F. Supp. 816, 822-23 (E.D. Ark. 1993); Elizabeth
Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995); Kansas Hosp. Ass'n
v. Whiteman, 835 F. Supp. 1556, 1571 (D. Kan. 1993); Arkansas Med. Soc', 6 F.3d at 530-31.
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developed, the District Court had wrongly refused to consider the substantive validity of the Plan.3 1 9 The court stated:
Since we have concluded that the state was in full procedural
compliance, plaintiffs must now adduce evidence that (1)
the methods and procedures adopted by the state were inadequate to insure "equal access" or (2) the bottom-line reimbursement figures derived under that methodology were too
low to retain health care providers in the Massachusetts
Medicaid Program.3 2 °
The court went on to hold that HCFA's approval of a Plan provision
was not dispositive.3 2 ' Instead, according to the court, HCFA's approval was entitled to some deference, but was not "automatically conclusive at the summary judgement stage. 3 22
Because there are a limited number of decisions addressing substantive compliance under section 1902 (a) (30), there are few guideposts regarding the evidence or standards that apply when a plaintiff
seeks to demonstrate a substantive violation. It appears, however,
that, as was the case under the Boren Amendment, a court will analyze
a state's compliance by examining aggregate data and not based upon
analysis of the Plan's impact on individual providers.1 23 One court,
for example, has held that determination of compliance with section
1902 (a) (30) is based upon statewide statistics regarding average reimbursement rates and provider participation.3 2 4 Yet another court has
held that proof of a substantive (or procedural) violation of section
1902 (a) (30) is available from a wide variety of sources including the
state, from public hearings, from proposed Plan changes and from
published state regulations.3 2 5
Significantly, however, some courts have held that a State Plan's
methods and standards must assure payments that are consistent with
economy, efficiency, quality of care and equal access without regard to
whether other regulations also obligate a provider to deliver care con-

319. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1011 (1st Cir.
1996).
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. Id.
323. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. Bullen, 866 F. Supp. 1444, 1452-53 (D. Mass. 1994), rev'd
on other grounds, 93 F.3d 997.
324. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527-28 (8th Cir. 1993).
325. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir.
1996).
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sistent with such standards. 326 For example, in OrthopaedicHospital v.
Belshe, the state attempted to defend its State Plan by arguing that a
direct link between the payment provisions and quality of care was
unnecessary because quality was assured by other regulations, including the Medicare certification regulations. 3 7 The Ninth Circuit however rejected the argument:
The Department argues that the payments do not independently have to support quality care because quality care is
assured by other regulations. Essentially, the Department's
position is that it doesn't have to pay the costs of quality care
because hospitals are contractually obligated to provide quality care once they agree to take Medicaid patients, and because hospitals' licensing requirements require them to
provide quality care. We disagree. The Department, itself,
must satisfy the requirement that the payment themselves be
consistent with quality care.3 28
Similarly, other courts have held that a failure to relate payments
to even one of the factors mandated by section 1902(a) (30) violates
the statute. 32 9 The state has an obligation to set payments consistent
with quality care that is independent of the hospital's obligation to
comply with licensure and certification standards. Although the
meaning of equal access and quality care may be defined by reference
to other statutes and regulations, such statutes and regulations do not
supplant the obligation to pay for care at the level mandated by the
statute.
The Boren Amendment conferred authority on the states to define key statutory terms governing compliance with federal law and to
determine whether their State Plans complied with those standards. If
the state provided a facially valid assurance to the Secretary that it had
complied with federal law the Secretary essentially was bound to approve the payment provisions of the State Plan and to provide matching federal funds. As a result, challenges to Medicaid payment plans
based on the Boren Amendment almost always were brought primarily or exclusively against the state. The appropriateness of the Secretary's decision approving the State Plans' payment provisions played
little, if any, role in the court's determination of the validity of the
326. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997). But see
DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
327. See Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1496-98.
328. Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1497.
329. See Ohio Hosp. Ass'n v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 579 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio
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State Plan. 3 ° There is only one reported case in which the Secretary's
approval of a State Medicaid Plan's payment provisions was a principal
focus of the plaintiff's challenge. 3 In that case, the court held that
the Secretary's decision to approve the State Plan was invalid because
the state's assurance that it had made a finding of compliance with
federal law obviously was facially invalid. 3 2
Repeal of the Boren Amendment eliminated the special substantive and procedural plan approval rules applicable to State Plan provisions governing institutional reimbursement. The Act now subjects
State Plan provisions regarding institutional payment to the same process applicable to all other State Plan provisions. The obligations imposed by the Act with regard to State Plan approval currently fall at
least as heavily upon the Secretary as upon the states.
Although enforcement of section 1902(a) (30) to date has focused, as it did under the Boren Amendment, on state compliance
with the Act, it seems likely that the validity of the Secretary's approval
of State Plan payment provisions also will become a focus of judicial
inquiry. Section 1902(a) (30) reallocates between the Secretary and
the states the obligations imposed by the Act with respect to the development and approval of State Medicaid Plan payment methodologies.
The Act imposes on the states the obligations to adopt a State Plan
that satisfies the standards set forth in section 1902(a) (30), in the first
instance, if the state wishes to obtain federal matching funds. In addition, however, the Act, in section 1902(a)(30) also specifically requires the Secretary to determine that the State Plan satisfies the
statutory standards in order for the state to obtain federal matching
funds. In contrast to the limited role assigned to the Secretary by the
Boren Amendment, the Act now places the obligation to determine
whether the Plan complies with federal law exclusively and squarely
on the Secretary.
Because the Secretary now has the obligation under the Act, entirely independent of the state, to approve only State Plan provisions
that satisfy the requirements of section 1902(a) (30), the appropriateness of the Secretary's decision to approve a State Plan is likely to be
challenged by providers and scrutinized by the courts. Undoubtedly,

330. In fact, noting that the Secretary's review and approval was largely perfunctory
courts often invalidated state payment plans even though the Secretary had approved the
plan. Indeed, the general rule was that the Secretary's approval of a state Medicaid payment plan was not even entitled to judicial deference.
331. See Erie County Geriatric Ctr. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 71, 71 (3d Cir. 1991)
332. See id.
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the Secretary will argue that the decision to approve a State Plan is
33 3
entitled to deference.
Whether deference is accorded to the Secretary's decision or not,
the reality is that the Secretary's decision to approve a State Plan is
now, in contrast to the situations under the Boren Amendment, a critical decision in the process of implementing institutional payment
methodologies. Consequently, the Secretary's decision undoubtedly
will be subject to more frequent challenges by providers and to more
searching judicial scrutiny.
Further, the Secretary will no longer be able to defend the decision to approve a State Plan's payment provisions based upon the assertion that HHS lacks authority to examine the state's rate setting
decisions or the validity of the assumptions underlying the Plans payment methodology. Instead, the Secretary will be required at a minimum to demonstrate that the State Plan approval rested on evidence
that provided a reasonable basis to believe that a Plan's methods and
procedures assured payments consistent with efficiency, economy,
quality of care and equality of access. In the past, the courts have
regularly rejected the attempts to justify State Plan payment methodologies based upon unsupported institutional assumptions, inadequate or unprincipled analysis and inadequate data. Indeed, because
state Medicaid programs likely will be unable or unwilling to rescind
new benefit programs introduced in the 1990's or to toughen eligibility, it is reasonable to anticipate that state Medicaid programs will attempt large cuts in provider reimbursement. Moreover, HHS, itself,
through the Departmental Appeals Board, has interpreted section
1902 (a) (3) (A) objective studies and data assembled at the time the
Plan was proposed. In sum, because of the Secretary's independent
authority and the critical role that the Secretary's approval decision
now plays, it is reasonable to anticipate that courts, at a minimum, will
require the Secretary to independently justify approval of the State
Plan's payment provisions with substantial evidence on the record as a
whole demonstrating that the methods and standards assure payment
consistent with each of the factors set forth in section 1902 (a) (30).
V.

CONCLUSION

Over the thirty-five years since the adoption of the Medicaid Act
Congress repeatedly has increased the authority of the states to determine the basis on which institutional providers will be reimbursed for
care and services rendered to program beneficiaries. The autonomy
333. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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granted the states has come at a price, however. Specifically, states
historically have reacted to budgetary pressures and shortfalls by reducing Medicaid funding, one of the largest, if not the largest, line
items in the states' budgets. There is, however, no free lunch and
institutional providers have been forced to make care choices based
on the shortfall in necessary or anticipated Medicaid payments. Both
the quantity and the quality of care may be impacted and, ultimately,
the states' citizenry pay the price in the form of reduced services or
treatment. Indeed, the history of the Medicaid Act is characterized by
cycles in which state control over institutional payment rates is increased followed shortly by increasing allegations that care, especially
nursing home care, is inadequate.
There is no indication that this historic tendency has abated since
the repeal of the Boren Amendment. Instead, the real impact of the
repeal of the Boren Amendment was obscured and deferred by the
years of economic expansion and budget surpluses that followed the
repeal. The states had no incentive to reduce Medicaid eligibility,
benefits or payments in such times. Not only were many state budgets
blessed with significant surpluses, the low unemployment rate meant
that the number of persons qualifying for Medicaid coverage was reduced. In such circumstances, rather than contracting their Medicaid
programs, many states began to expand their programs, loosening eligibility requirements, expanding available benefits and increasing
provider payments.
As the economy slowed, however, states once again began to consider slashing Medicaid spending and payments for institutional care,
however, especially long term care, which was an obvious target because it comprised such a large percentage of the Medicaid budget.
Indeed, because state Medicaid programs likely will be unable or unwilling to rescind new benefit programs introduced in the 1990s or to
toughen eligibility, it is reasonable to anticipate that state Medicaid
programs will attempt large cuts in provider reimbursement.3 3 4
The repeal of the Boren Amendment has encouraged Medicaid
officials - albeit incorrectly - to believe that federal law places no
fetters on their discretion. Yet, the obvious consequence of reducing
334. See generally Medicaid Budgets, supra note 1; Robert Pear, States Face Hard Choices on
Medicaid Cuts, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at 1. See also Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries,
Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 921 (5th Cir. 2000) (rate change justified by state's need to
address budget deficit); Tallahassee Memorial Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 704
(11 th Cir. 1997) (state Medicaid agency's rate cuts shift burden of program's shortfall to
providers); Florida Ass'n of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Florida, 1999 'AL 304638 at *5
(S.D. Fla. 1999).
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funding in this fashion is to invite litigation. When institutional providers are no longer able to comply with minimum standards and lack
any other realistic options, it is reasonable to expect that they will
bring lawsuits, as they have in the past, seeking to compel principled
rate setting and to obtain rates sufficient to provide quality care.
Despite the repeal of the Boren Amendment, the Medicaid Act
continues to contain payment criteria that institutional care providers
can enforce. The repeal of the Boren Amendment eliminated special
payment criteria and State Plan approval procedures favorable to
states and applicable only to payments to institutional providers. As a
result, states no longer have the benefit of Boren's limitations and
providers may enforce the Act's basic payment requirements.
Section 1902(a) (30) contains enforceable payment standards
that predate even Boren. Under that section, the Secretary is required to provide federal funding only for State Plans that include
payment methodologies and procedures that assure that payments are
consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that Medicaid beneficiaries have
the same access to services as the general population. Unlike the situation under Boren, compliance with section 1902 should depend at
least as much on the substantive impact of the state's Medicaid payments as on the procedures used to develop the payment standards.

